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Search warrants are a critical and frequently used tool in the criminal
investigative process. They are of such great historical importance that the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically addresses
search warrants. Public policy favors searches pursuant to warrants issued
by the court over warrantless searches and seizures by law enforcement
because the warrant issuance process incorporates the checks and balances
that are the foundation of our constitutional system of government. War-
rants sought by the Executive Branch must be independently authorized by
the Judicial Branch.
To what extent, and in what circumstances, should there be public ac-
cess to and scrutiny of search warrants? Since the late 1980s, federal courts
have struggled with the issue of access to search warrant materials from
their issuance through the criminal trial process. Determining access to
search warrant documents requires balancing competing interests of the
government, the affected individuals, and the public during certain stages of
the justice process. Federal courts, for the most part, have inadequately
identified the competing interests and have failed to develop an appropriate
framework for resolution of the access issue.
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The following article describes the federal search warrant process,
identifies and discusses the individual, governmental, and public interests at
stake, and addresses how these interests are affected by the stages of the
justice system. The article then sets forth an analysis of the circuit court
access cases, discusses the procedural application of an "access test," and
proposes a specific framework for an access test that meets the objectives of
the justice system.
II. THE ISSUANCE OF A FEDERAL SEARCH WARRANT AND SEARCH
WARRANT DOCUMENTS
A federal search warrant is issued upon establishment of probable
cause that contraband, evidence of a crime, or the fruits of a crime may be
located at a certain place.' The location must be described with particularity,
as must the items to be seized.2 The warrant may be issued by a federal
magistrate, or in some instances, a state court judge.3 The warrant is issued
either upon an affidavit sworn to before the issuing judge, or, in limited
circumstances, based upon recorded oral testimony.4 Once issued, a search
warrant must be executed within ten days.5
Typically, the documents associated with a federal search warrant con-
sist of the warrant, an application for the warrant, a probable cause affidavit,
the return, and an inventory. The warrant describes the property or place to
be searched, the items to be seized, the date and time issued, and the issuing
judicial officer. The application contains the same information as the war-
rant, along with either the statement of probable cause or the attached affi-
davit of probable cause. The application is signed by the probable cause
affiant, typically a law enforcement officer, and by the issuing judicial offi-
cer before whom the basis for probable cause is sworn. The inventory is a
listing of all items seized during the search. The return shows when the exe-
cuting officer received the warrant, when the warrant was executed, and in
whose presence the inventory was prepared.
Once executed, the warrant, return, and inventory are returned to the
magistrate. A copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property seized are
given to the person from whose premises or possession the property is
taken, or may be left at the searched premises.6 After the magistrate receives
the return and inventory, he or she is directed to file the warrant, return,
1. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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inventory, and "all other papers in connection therewith" with the clerk of
court for the district in which the property was seized.7
There is no requirement that an attorney for the government be in-
cluded in the search warrant application, execution, or return process. Law
enforcement officers typically make applications for search warrants di-
rectly to the issuing judicial officer. Furthermore, there is no requirement
that the statements made in the affidavit set forth only evidence that would
be admissible at trial. The rules of evidence do not apply,8 and the use of
hearsay is common in applications. Because the affidavit is often prepared
at the beginning of a law enforcement investigation, it may contain a broad
spectrum of facts supporting probable cause, including investigators' opin-
ions based on knowledge and experience, statements from confidential
sources, and preliminary conclusions.
III. INTERESTS AT STAKE IN DETERMINING EXTENT AND SCOPE OF ACCESS
TO SEARCH WARRANT MATERIALS
Different parties may request access to search warrant materials at
various stages in the justice process. The government, the affected individ-
ual(s), and the public are all parties in interest. Courts typically apply "ac-
cess tests" to weigh the competing interests of these parties. Among the
factors considered are how documents are routinely filed with the court or
the presumptive right of access to criminal trial proceedings and docu-
ments.9
The criminal justice process, however, is not a static set of events
across which the various interests can be balanced according to a single set
of parameters. The various stages of the justice process include pre-
indictment/investigation, indictment, post-indictment/pre-trial, trial, sen-
tencing, post-conviction/rehabilitation, and release/monitoring. Interests
must be evaluated according to the purpose of justice inherent within each
of these stages. Few courts, however, have evaluated and defined the nature
of these interests and what they mean in relation to the status or timing of a
proceeding or document in the justice process. For example, courts have yet
to state clearly the objectives of each interest in the pre-indictment stage and
render an opinion based upon balancing these objectives according to their
purposes at that point in the justice process.' 0
In order to make a rational finding as to appropriate access to search
warrant materials, it is important to discuss the overall nature of each inter-
est and the inherent purpose of the stage in the criminal justice process.
7. Id. 41(i).
8. FED. R. EviD. 1101(d)(3).
9. See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
10. See discussion infra Parts IV-V.
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A. What Is the Individual's Interest?
The "individual's interest" throughout the justice process is ordinarily
attributed to the defendant. Many different individuals have interests relat-
ing to a particular case, including a victim, witness, juror, or the defendant's
family member or associate. The individual interest has two components: a
property interest and a personal privacy interest. A property interest is sim-
ply the individual's right to and ownership of physical property that may be
part of a criminal action, for example, real or physical property seized pur-
suant to a search warrant. Personal privacy interests, however, are more
complex as stated in the Justice Information Privacy Guideline. "'Privacy'
is described as the interrelated values, rights, and interests unique to indi-
viduals. Privacy interests come in a variety of flavors, including privacy of
the person, privacy of personal behavior, privacy of personal communica-
tions, and privacy of personal data (information privacy).""
Information privacy is the individual interest at issue with respect to
search warrant materials. This interest is described as when, how, to whom,
and to what extent one shares personal information about oneself with the
world at large. 12 The concept of information privacy places a right with the
individual to control how information about him is gathered and used by
others. It is important to note, however, that such an information privacy
right is not a constitutional right and does not receive constitutional protec-
tions. 1 3 Rather, information privacy is an accepted concept inherent in what
11. TuE NAT'L CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASS'N, JUSTICE INFORMATION PRIVACY GUIDELINE 12
(Sept. 2002), available at http://www.ncja.org/pdf/privacyguideline.pdf. Privacy of the per-
son relates to an assertion of one's physical privacy. Privacy of personal behavior relates to
one's desire to keep his acts out of the public eye. Privacy of personal communications re-
lates to the desire to keep conversations and written or electronic communications from
public disclosure. Privacy of personal data, or information privacy, relates to keeping infor-
mation about oneself from public disclosure. Id. at 13.
12. Id. at 12-13. "Personal information," commonly used within the justice system, may
include "[i]nformation relating to race, national or ethnic origin, religion, age, sex, sexual
orientation, or marital or family status; [i]nformation relating to education, medical, psychiat-
ric, psychological, criminal, financial, or employment history; [a]ny identifying number,
symbol or other particular assigned to the individual; [n]ame, address, telephone number,
fingerprints, blood type, or DNA." Id. at 13 (citing the United States Federal Privacy Act of
1974, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1999)). For a further detailed analysis of information
privacy within the justice system, see id. at 12-20.
13. Although commonly described as a "privacy right," individual privacy is not a fun-
damental right explicitly defined in the United States Constitution. See Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890).
Although the United States Supreme Court has not recognized a "general right to
privacy," some aspects of privacy of the person are protected under the Fourth Amendment,
and some aspects of privacy of personal behavior are protected as penumbra of fundamental
rights outlined in the Constitution. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976) (explain-
ing penumbra of constitutional rights); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (explaining
protection from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (stating, "the protection of a person's general
[Vol. 25
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courts characterize as "an individual's interest" in court documents, such as
search warrant materials. 14
B. What Is the Government's Interest?
When courts discuss "the government's interest" in search warrant ma-
terials, they generally refer to an investigative law enforcement interest.15
right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of his property
and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States"). In Paul, the Supreme
Court stated that "[w]hile there is no 'right of privacy' found in any specific guarantee of the
Constitution, the Court has recognized that 'zones of privacy' may be created by more spe-
cific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government power." Paul,
424 U.S. at 712-13 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (noting personal
privacy rights in the "zones of privacy" are those such as "matters relating to marriage, pro-
creation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education")). Id. at 713.
Where a person seeks to engage in confidential communication, the privacy of per-
sonal communications is recognized as part of the protection from unlawful searches and
seizures provided by the Fourth Amendment. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (finding that a person
had an expectation of privacy in his conversation when such conversation took place within a
telephone booth). Generally, however, privacy of one's personal information and reputation
or communications that a person does not seek to keep private have not been found to fall
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment or the penumbra of constitutional rights
described above. Id. Personal communications privacy, however, is recognized and protected
to some extent under other forms of federal law. For example, certain communications are
protected by statute, such as electronic wire communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2002)
("Title Ii") (interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications prohib-
ited absent court authorization). Additionally, some communications are protected through
assertion of evidentiary privileges (for example, attorney/client, marital, psychothera-
pist/patient, clergy/penitent). FED. R. EVID. 501; see, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,
10-11 (1996) (psychotherapist/patient privilege); Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389
(1985) (attorney/client privilege); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980)
(marital privilege); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384 (3d Cir. 1990)
(clegy/communicant privilege); United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1987)
(clergy/penitent privilege).
Similarly, though not constitutionally protected, the collection, use, and disclosure
of certain personal information, such as medical, financial, and educational information, is
protected by statute. See, e.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services Modernization
Act of 1999), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)
(2000 & Supp. 2002); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000 & Supp. 2002);
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000); Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2002); Family Educational Rights and Pri-
vacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2000); Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320(d)(2) (2000).
14. See, e.g., Certain Interested Individuals, John Does I-V v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 895
F.2d 460, 463, 467 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Gunn 17") (noting the petitioner's "individual interest"
under Title 1II, and individual interest in non-disclosure of pre-indictment material); Applica-
tion of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the "common law right of
access is qualified by recognition of the privacy rights of the person whose intimate relations
may thereby be disclosed"); Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1216 (9th




The government, however, is much broader than just law enforcement, in-
cluding the judicial and legislative branches. It is not an entity unto itself
seeking to make, interpret, and enforce the laws for its own benefit-the
government is the embodiment of the public. Therefore, the government's
true interest lies in the administration of justice through applying the rules
and procedures of the justice system on behalf of the public.
When weighing the government's interest in the context of criminal
search warrants, it is important to note that the government's interest is as
strongly represented by a court's involvement in finding probable cause
upon which to issue the search warrant as it is by a law enforcement
agency's desire to conduct the search.1 6 It is important to keep these equal
and competing interests in mind when using the term "government's inter-
est" and balancing this interest against that of the individual and the public.
C. What Is the Public's Interest?
In order to discuss the "public's interest" it is important to first define
"the public." Broadly stated, "the public" is everyone except the subject
individual(s) and the government entities associated with the particular case
at issue. This includes persons, various groups (business, educational, reli-
gious, etc.), other government entities, and the media. The segments that
make up "the public" might not represent a consolidated interest-there
may be a variety of interests at stake. For example, one interest may be to
access government records in order to ferret out abuse or corruption in the
system. 7 This supports open access to information in the justice system. A
competing interest may be to promote investigation by law enforcement to
protect the public from criminal acts of individuals. 8 This interest supports
limited access to information in the justice system.
15. See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1214-16 (explaining the importance of the govern-
ment's search warrant and investigative process); In re Search Warrant for the Secretarial
Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn, McDonnell Douglas Corp., 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th
Cir. 1988) ("Gunn 1") (noting "[t]he government has demonstrated that restricting public
access to these documents is necessitated by a compelling government interest-the on-
going investigation."). See infra notes 62, 64, 81 and accompanying text.
16. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 sets forth requirements for issuance of a
search warrant. The Rule states that a search warrant is issued by the court after receiving an
affidavit or other information "if there is probable cause to search for and seize a person or
property under Rule 41(c)." FED. R. CrtM. P. 41(d)(1)(amended 2002).
17. This is the public interest as noted by Judge McMillan in Gunn I, 855 F.2d at 573
(stating, "public access to documents filed in support of search warrants... may operate as a
curb on prosecutorial of judicial misconduct."). See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
18. This interest is espoused by Judge Bowman in his concurring opinion in Gunn I, 855
F.2d at 575 (noting, "the public interest in knowing facts produced by uncompromised inves-
tigation," the successful prosecution of wrongdoers, and fairness to innocent parties). See
infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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The public's interest weighed by courts in the balancing tests is as-
serted by the party opposing the government or opposing the individual.
This party is usually the media asserting the public's interest as an access
interest.' 9 This is true because the media makes its living on revealing in-
formation to the public. In certain contexts, however, access may not be
what the other members of the public consider the "public's interest."
Therefore, when balancing the public's interest, as asserted by the media,
against the individual's interest and the government's interest, it is impor-
tant to consider that the public's interest does not belong exclusively to the
media and weigh the arguments accordingly.
IV. How DOES THE JUSTICE PROCESS AFFECT BALANCING INDIVIDUAL,
GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC INTERESTS?
Access to justice information cannot be evaluated according to a static
test because the time at which a party desires access to information signifi-
cantly affects the balancing of an individual's interest, the government's
interest, and the public's interest. The justice system is comprised of a series
of separate, yet interrelated, stages taking place over time. The stages in-
clude pre-indictment/investigation, indictment, pre-trial/prosecution, sen-
19. For example, the media asserted "public interest" in Gunn I, 855 F.2d at 572; see
also, Gunn II, 895 F.2d at 463-64; Newsday, 895 F.2d at 75; Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at
1212; Baltimore Sun v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1989). See discussion infra Part IV.
Additionally, many district court cases are initiated by the media's assertion of the public's
interest. See, e.g., United States v. Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198 (D. R.I. 2001) (showing
that media assert public access to warrants executed on city hall and other locations); United
States v. Sealed Search Warrants, 28 Media L. Rep. 1151, 1999 WL 1455215, at *1 (D. N.J
Sept. 2 1999) (involving search warrants in investigation of city mayor); United States v.
Certain Real Prop. Located in Romulus, Wayne County, Mich., 977 F. Supp. 833, 834 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) (requesting to open sealed warrants in a civil forfeiture matter); United States v.
In re Search Warrants in Connection with Investigation of Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.
in El Paso, Tex., 971 F. Supp. 251, 252 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (involving search warrant docu-
ments where hundreds of FBI agents took part in the execution of warrants at various hospi-
tals in El Paso); In re Search of Office Suites for World and Islam Studies Enter., 925 F.
Supp. 738, 739 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (search warrants relating to investigation of Sami Al-
Arian); In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. 1563, 1564 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (search war-
rants regarding Richard Jewell and the bombing at Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta dur-
ing the 1996 Olympics); In re Documents 1, 2, and 3 the Search Warrant and Supporting
Affidavits Relating to Theodore John Kaczynski, United States v. Kaczynski, 24 Media L.
Rep. 1700, 1996 WL 343429, at *1 (D. Mont. Apr. 10, 1996) (search warrants relating to
Theodore Kaczyinski in the unibomber case); In re Search Warrant, No. M-3-94-80, 1996
WL 1609166, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 1996) (unsealing previously sealed search warrant
and affidavit following guilty plea and the close of the investigation); In re Macon Tel.
Publ'g Co., 900 F. Supp. 489, 489 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (involving warrants to search sheriff's
office). It is interesting to note that all of these district court cases involved high profile in-
vestigations. The media does not seem interested in asserting the public's interest in search
warrants executed on ordinary citizens in the course of day-to-day law enforcement investi-
gations.
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tencing, post-conviction/rehabilitation, and monitoring/release. Various
government agencies are responsible for carrying out functions in each of
these stages. These government agencies would include law enforcement,
prosecution, defense, courts, corrections, probation and parole departments.
To discern correctly the government's interest at any single stage, it is im-
portant to identify the government agencies at work at that stage, and their
purposes. Similarly, to discern an individual's interest or the public's inter-
est at any stage, it is important to identify the privacy/property interest at
stake and the composition of the public at that stage.
At issue in this article is access to search warrant documents. There-
fore, the analysis below considers search warrant materials, including affi-
davits, warrants, and returns, and assesses competing interests related to a
request for access to these materials pre-indictmqnt, post-indictment, and
where no indictment is returned.
A. Pre-indictment Interests at Stake
Each individual, the government, and the public have an interest in
open access to search warrant material, as well as competing interests in
restricted access. The individual interests stem from property and personal
privacy interests. The government interests stem from differing aspects of
conducting an effective criminal investigation. The public interests relate to
oversight of governmental functions and preservation of personal liberties.
1. Individual
An individual's interest includes a property interest and a privacy in-
terest. When a search warrant is executed by law enforcement, the individ-
ual's property may be seized. The individual has an interest in the return of
that property. The property interest is addressed in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which allow the individual to file a motion for the re-
turn of seized property.2 °
20. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure or by the deprivation of
property may move for the property's return. The motion must be filed in the
district where the property was seized. The court must receive evidence on any
issue of fact necessary to decide the motion. If it grants the motion, the court
must return the property to the movant, but may impose reasonable conditions to
protect access to the property and its use in later proceedings.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g) (amended 2002).
This section was formally FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). In the pre-indictment stage, courts
differ on the standard to be followed when determining whether the individual has a right to
return of the property under investigation by a grand jury. Sometimes the individual must
show "irreparable injury," whereas "[o]ther courts have refused to read an irreparable harm
requirement into the plain language of Rule 41(e)." In re Search Warrant Executed Feb. 1,
1995, No. M18-65 (RJW), 1995 WL 406276, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1995) (internal cita-
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The more complex interest is the individual's privacy interest in the in-
formation contained in the search warrant documents. 2' Search warrant
documents often contain personal information about the subject, as well as
evidence of criminal acts described in support of probable cause for the
search warrant. This information may be damaging to an individual's repu-
tation if released. Moreover, the right of the individual to have a fair trial
22may be adversely affected by the disclosure of search warrant information.
For these reasons, an individual may seek to prevent the information from
being released to the public.23
tions omitted). In that case the petitioner argued that the "illegal seizures of his property and
business records ... damaged his reputation and thereby threatened his livelihood." Id. The
court found that he failed to demonstrate a "significant decline in revenues [or] an unwilling-
ness of customers to conduct business with him" constituting irreparable injury. Id. The court
chose not to interfere with the grand jury investigative process, holding that unless there was
a showing of irreparable injury, the claim was better resolved in the form of a motion to
suppress the evidence post-indictment. Id. The court noted that the property was business
records and documents, a copy of which had been offered to the affected party. Id. In that
circumstance, "a party can rarely, if ever, demonstrate that the seizure.., caused irreparable
harm." Id.; accord, In re Search of Eyecare Physicians of Am., 910 F. Supp. 414, 420 (N.D.
I11.), aff'd 100 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1996).
In contrast, the District of Minnesota required no showing by the individual of any
harm from the seizure of property. See In re Search of Up North Plastics, Inc., 940 F. Supp.
229, 233 (D. Minn. 1996). In Up North, the court required the disclosure of the search war-
rant documents solely on the petitioner's need to challenge effectively the probable cause in
the affidavit. Id. (finding that "[t]o permit an affidavit or any documents in support of a
search warrant to remain sealed against examination by the person whose property was
searched deprives him of the right secured by Rule 41 to challenge the search"). This holding
allows for a challenge to the probable cause of the warrant prior to any formal charges being
entered against the petitioner, in effect raising suppression issues before any criminal charges
have been filed against the individual. In Up North, the court found that the government did
not meet its burden of compelling need to seal the search warrant materials and rejected the
notion of an ongoing grand jury investigation. Id. at 233-35; cf Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at
1220 (finding that Rule 41 creates no new rights).
21. There may be more individuals who have a privacy concern than have a property
concern. For example, in Gunn I the search warrant involved the secretarial area outside
Gunn's office at McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC). Gunn I, 855 F.2d at 570-71. As
illustrated in Gunn I1, Gunn, MDC, and four unidentified persons asserted privacy interest
whereas, perhaps, only MDC had a property interest. Gunn II, 895 F.2d at 461.
22. See Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (explaining that "[m]edia access also may be
restricted in order to protect the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial").
23. See, e.g., Gunn II, 895 F.2d at 467 (holding that privacy interests of affected parties
justify continued closure of entire affidavit pre-indictment); In re Search of Office Suites for
World and Islam Studies Enter., 925 F. Supp. at 739 (noting the subject individual's opposi-
tion to unsealing the documents due to irreparable damage to his reputation caused by media
accounts of his involvement in the investigation); In re Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 900 F. Supp.
at 492-93. "Any smear upon an innocent individual's good name that would be caused by a
release of information surrounding the execution of a search warrant will not be removed in
the eyes of the public until such time as the grand jury refuses to return an indictment. Even
then, character rehabilitation is much more difficult than denigration caused by revealing
information relative to an investigation of that person." Id.
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In addition, the individual privacy interests of non-subjects are also
implicated. It is not uncommon for affidavits to identify by name witnesses
or persons who provided information to the government. Typically, the pri-
vacy interests of these persons is asserted by the government as part of the
24law enforcement investigative interest. Even in instances where the court
grants access to warrant documents, names and personal information are
almost always redacted to continue non-disclosure of cooperating witness
identification.25
Conversely, an individual may seek personal access to this informa-
tion, to gain insight into the law enforcement investigation. In this case the
information may be helpful to an individual in preparing to defend his case,
or, in nefarious circumstances, evading the law or destroying further evi-
dence of a crime. Therefore, the individual may seek access to the informa-
tion pre-indictment.26
24. See discussion infra notes 102 and 104.
25. See In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. 1563, 1570-71 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
26. Id. In this case, involving Richard Jewel and the Atlanta Olympic bombing, Jewel
moved for disclosure of the search warrant materials. Id. at 1564. He was granted access to
limited, redacted materials and was required to sign a non-disclosure agreement. Id. at 1565.
Subsequently, the media sued for access to the search warrant materials. The court awarded
access to the redacted materials, limiting the disclosure of witnesses and law enforcement
tactics. Id. at 1571. In so doing, the court determined that the materials should be released
because, in its view, the investigation of Mr. Jewel had been completed. Id.
Some articles cite a need to remedy personal inconvenience, a violation of a "digni-
tary interest," or an inability to challenge the investigation of law enforcement as primary
support for individual access pre-indictment. See David Horan, Breaking the Seal on White-
Collar Criminal Search Warrant Materials, 28 PEPP. L. REv. 317, 336 (2001) (stating that a
search in and of itself so violates a person's "dignitary interest" that no post-search access to
warrant material can restore the privacy interest upon which the search intruded); but see
Peter G. Blumberg, Sunshine and Ill Wind: The Forecast for Public Access to Sealed Search
Warrants, 41 DEPAuL L. REv. 431, 471 (1992) (supporting public access and suggesting that
an individual needs to show "intensified pain" from release of search warrant information in
order to overcome the access interest). An individual's inconvenience in being searched and
his desire to know what law enforcement is investigating, however, does not support an
information access right. There are no independent remedies for inconvenience or being a
subject of an investigation at the pre-indictment stage of the justice process. Without a for-
mal charge, there is not yet any suppression issue that necessitates looking at the basis for the
probable cause search.
As in Up North, petitioners may guise a challenge to probable cause in a motion for
return of property under Rule 41(g). See supra note 20. Additionally, where clearly abusive
law enforcement tactics are employed in executing the search, the individual may have a
claim for damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397 (1971) (holding that "petitioner is entitled to recover money damages for any injuries he
has suffered as a result of the agents' violation of the [Fourth] Amendment"). See also In re
Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. at 1569 (noting that Richard Jewel originally requested
access to the search warrant documents in order to file a Rule 41(g) motion for return of
property or a civil claim for damages under Bivens). Such claims still do not support unfet-
tered access to the information contained in the search warrant documents, given the gov-
ernment and the public's interests at stake.
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2. Government
The government agencies involved in pre-indictment search warrants
are law enforcement agencies and the courts. Law enforcement seeks war-
rants as part of the investigatory process. The courts are responsible for as-
suring that probable cause exists to search the places described in the war-
rant.27 At this stage, the law enforcement interest is primarily in keeping
search warrant information from disclosure. This interest is based on a
number of factors.
First, law enforcement desires to protect the investigation. Search war-
rant materials often outline the procedures and tactics followed by law en-
forcement. Access to this information would allow subjects to flee the juris-
diction or to destroy pertinent evidence. 8
Second, search warrant materials often contain names and personal
identifying information of witnesses or victims of a crime. Law enforcement
has a responsibility to protect the personal privacy and physical security of
these parties during the investigation.29
Third, to be effective in performing its public service function, law en-
forcement may have a duty to protect the privacy interests of an individual
who is the target of the search warrant. The search warrant is based on in-
formation obtained through initial investigation, which lends probable cause
sufficient to further the investigation through a search. The search may not
lead to indictment or formal charges. Therefore, in the pre-indictment stage,
the target has a privacy interest in not having his or her name disclosed to
the public in connection with a possible crime.
30
27. The United States Constitution, amendment IV reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41 (d)(1) states: "After receiving an affida-
vit or other information, a magistrate judge or a judge of a state court of record must issue
the warrant if there is probable cause to search for and seize a person or property under
Rule 41(c)." FED. R. CRiM. P. 41(d)(1)(amended 2002) (emphasis added).
28. Many courts have cited this interest as a basis to justify continued closure. See dis-
cussion infra note 98 and accompanying text.
29. See discussion infra notes 102, 104, 137, 138 and accompanying text.
30. Law enforcement does not always follow this rule of protection. The results are
evident in the case of the Maryland scientist who was identified as a "person of interest" by
the United States Attorney General in the anthrax investigation. Press coverage of the search
of his house and his girlfriend's residence lead to much embarrassment for the subject and
possible witness and forced him to make a number of public statements to proclaim his inno-
cence. The disclosure occurred pre-indictment. No formal charges had been brought, or have
been brought to date. The scientist lost his employment and suffered great emotional stress as
a result of law enforcement failing to protect his privacy interests during the investigation.
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Finally, law enforcement bears a responsibility to the public to protect
all of these interests by advocating non-disclosure of search warrant materi-
als before formal charges are filed.
In contrast, the judiciary's interest is one of neutrality and oversight. A
court's interest lies in protecting the target individual from law enforcement
overreaching by ensuring that probable cause for the search exists. Some
courts have expanded their pre-indictment interest to include promoting
public access to search warrant materials. This is a controversial position for
the courts to take. The court's role in issuing search warrants serves to
check the executive branch's power. If the court performs this role cor-
rectly, there is no need for the court to grant further public oversight at this
stage. If the court asserts public access, it may directly affect the target indi-
vidual's interest in non-disclosure. Courts' practices at this stage of the jus-
tice process are not uniform from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
31
3. Public
The public's interest is often claimed by the media, arguing for open
access. This interest is based on accessing search warrant materials to pre-
vent corruption in the system and abusive law enforcement tactics, or is
otherwise based on general notions of self-governance. The public, how-
ever, has an equally valid interest in non-disclosure to enable investigation
by law enforcement, to aid the successful prosecution of wrongdoers, to
The only apparent benefit was to the media, which had a "breaking news" story for one or
two days and which continued to follow the controversy throughout the month of August
2002. See H.J. Brier, Scientist Raps Ashcroft for Anthrax Probe; Says FBI Ransacked Girl-
friend's Home, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at Al; Guy Gugliotta, Still No Arrests in An-
thrax Probe, but 'Progress' Is Noted, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2002, at A8; Tom Jackman,
Hatfill Again Protests Treatment; Scientist Assails FBI, Proclaims Innocence in Anthrax
Attacks, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2002, at A2; Tom Jackman, Handling of Anthrax Inquiry
Questioned; Scientist's Attorney Criticizes Ashcroft Statements, Accuses FBI of Leaks to
Media, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2002, at A13; Tom Jackman, Scientist Steps Up Anthrax De-
fense; Grievances Aired Before Media Throng, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2002, at B 1; Tom
Jackman, Ex-Army Scientist Denies Role in Anthrax Attacks; 'My Life is Destroyed' by
Probe, Media, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2002, at Al; Tom Jackman, Researcher is Suspended
During Probe of Anthrax, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2002, at A3; Tom Jackman & Dan Eggen,
Maryland Home Searched in Probe of Anthrax; Agents Revisit Former Army Researcher,
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2002, at A13; Susan Schmidt, Evidence Lacking as Probe of Scientist
in Anthrax Scare Intensifies, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2002, at A7; Guy Taylor, Scientist Says
FBI Asked About Setup; Anthrax Researcher in the Spotlight, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at
A2; Arlo Wagner, Scientist's Abode Searched 3rd Time in Anthrax Probe, WASH. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2002, at A3; Anthrax Related Search Unproductive, WASH. POST, June 27, 2002, at
B3.
31. See discussion infra Part VII.B. The Eastern District of Arkansas plays an active
role in promoting public disclosure pre-indictment.
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protect the privacy of individuals named in search warrant documents, and
32to prevent the spread of rumors based on preliminary information.
B. Balancing the Pre-Indictment Interests
The interests may be charted as follows:
Individual Government Public
Interest Interest Interest
Open Access Ability to mount Ability to inform Prevent possible
defense, thwart public of inves- government
further investiga- tigation progress overreaching and
tion or flee corruption;
Satisfy curiosity
Closed Preserve reputa- Prevent exposure Prevent injury to
No Access tion; of investigation, individual pri-
Prevent embar- target and tech- vacy and law
rassment from niques; enforcement
public disclosure Prevent injury to investigation
subject and wit-
nesses
Each group has at least one interest that can be articulated for open ac-
cess to search warrant materials or no access to search warrant materials.
The interest that is more important to any group in a certain case will be the
interest asserted in a challenge to the access process. Courts must balance
the interests raised by each group. The balancing is often highly subjective
at the pre-indictment stage of the justice process.33 In weighing the interests,
courts must take into account the inherent goals of society and the checks
and balances within the justice system.
The fundamental principle of our form of government is divided and
shared powers and responsibilities. The executive branch has the power and
responsibility to enforce laws. The judicial branch oversees the enforcement
and, as it pertains to search warrants, must authorize their issuance and exe-
cution.34
32. See Gunn II, 855 F.2d 460, 575 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bowman, J., concurring) (explain-
ing the public's interest in an uncompromised investigation and successful prosecution of
those who committed crimes against the United States). Since the decision in Gunn II, the
Middle District of Georgia has relied on this language in ruling to keep search warrant
documents sealed in an ongoing investigation. See In re Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 900 F. Supp.
489,492-93 (1995).
33. See infra Part IV for a discussion of balancing these interests with the standard First
Amendment and common law access tests employed by the courts to date.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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For example, one goal of society is to promote fair investigation. An-
other goal of society is to protect the privacy and physical security of coop-
erating witnesses, victims, law enforcement officers, and the investigative
target. While it may promote an individual's selfish interest, it does not
promote society's interest to allow an individual to access search warrant
materials in order to conduct further crimes or to harm witnesses. Similarly,
while some members of law enforcement may view it as a valid interest to
publicize the scope and direction of an investigation, it is adverse to soci-
ety's interest to allow the government to use open access to search warrants
where the consequence is defamation or embarassment of citizens. It is not a
goal of society to allow for overreaching of law enforcement and intrusion
of government upon citizens. It is not a goal of society to allow access to
search warrant materials to hinder investigations, to create rumors, or to
further public speculation. These are premises that should affect how courts
balance the interests of each group.
Inherent checks within the justice system support these societal goals.
First, the balance of powers between the executive and judicial branches is
evident in the issuance of search warrants. 35 At this stage the judiciary acts
35. Law enforcement can initiate a search and seizure without a warrant. In certain
circumstances these searches are lawful, such as a search incident to arrest, a search under
the threat of immediate destruction of evidence, a search pursuant to a "hot pursuit," or a
"stop and frisk." See, e.g., N.Y. v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-61 (1981) (dealing with
searches of areas within arrestee's immediate control proper); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443
U.S. 31, 35-36 (1979) (dealing with searches of individual incident to lawful arrest author-
izes search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (dealing with a reasonable suspicion per-
son was engaged in wrongdoing, along with reasonable suspicion that he may be armed, as
proper support for stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297-300 (1967) (deal-
ing with pursuit of armed subject into a house and search thereof permitted); United States v.
Delguyd, 542 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 1976) (discussing exigent circumstances necessary to
justify a warrantless entry to an apartment where police concluded that evidence was being
destroyed).
In other instances warrantless searches may be deemed unlawful, and courts will
suppress the evidence post-indictment. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)
(finding no murder scene exception to warrant requirement; thus, four day warrantless search
of apartment following a homicide was not justified). This post indictment suppression,
however, does necessarily dissuade law enforcement from conducting warrantless searches.
The courts encourage law enforcement to conduct searches pursuant to warrants by shifting
the burden to the defendant to challenge a search done pursuant to a warrant. For example,
case law supports reasonable law enforcement actions by providing a presumption of good
faith in swearing a probable cause affidavit. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171
(1978) (holding that there is a "presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit support-
ing [a] search warrant," and inquiry into the veracity of the affiant's statement requires that
the defendant make a substantial preliminary showing that a "false statement [was made by
the officer] knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth"). Addition-
ally, where an officer executes a warrant issued by the court, there is a presumption of "good
faith execution" by the officer, even though the warrant may have been defective. See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (finding that, "[s]earches pursuant to a warrant will
rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate
normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in con-
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as a proxy for the individual and the public by providing a check on the
investigative powers of law enforcement.36 For example, the judiciary is
required to find probable cause that there is evidence of a crime in the
places to be searched. 37 Further, a search warrant issued by the court is sub-
jected to scrutiny down-the-line in the justice process. Abuses of discretion
may result in suppression of the evidence or dismissal of the case.38
Second, the grand jury protects the individual by acting as another fact-
finding body between law enforcement investigation and official charges.39
ducting the search"); Id. at 920 (finding that "[t]his is particularly true ... when an officer
acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and
acted within its scope"). By encouraging the use of search warrants, the judiciary is better
able to oversee the executive's probable cause basis for searches before they take place.
36. See In re Search of 1993 Jeep Grand Cherokee, Nos. 96-91M, 96-92M, 96-93M,
1996 WL 768293, at *8 (D. Del. Oct. 11, 1996), explaining that:
[t]he purpose of having a 'neutral and detached magistrate' determine probable
cause is to safeguard against a prosecutor's overzealousness or bias from effect-
ing [sic] his judgment, and insure that a disinterested party objectively reviews
the government's proffer of probable cause .... The judiciary's role is to serve
as a check upon corrupt law enforcement practices. Thus, a further check upon
this procedure ... is redundant and counterproductive.
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(1) (amended 2002). Probable cause, generally, is found
"where facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reasonably discreet and prudent man
would be led to believe that there was a commission of the offense charged." Dumbra v.
United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925). In finding probable cause in a search warrant, an
issuing judge is required to make "a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of
knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contra-
band or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238 (1983). This is known as the "totality of the circumstances" test. Id. at 230-31.
38. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, following arraignment, the defen-
dant may move pre-trial to suppress evidence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(C) (amended 2002).
The defendant may challenge the warrant on a number of grounds, including whether the
warrant was issued on probable cause, is facially deficient and void, or whether the search
exceeded the scope of the warrant. See generally Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 871-73
(8th Cir. 1998) (explaining the challenge of the search warrant based on lack of probable
cause and execution beyond scope of the warrant). The issuing judge's probable cause find-
ing must comply with the "totality of the circumstances" test, and is reviewed by the district
court according to whether the judge "had a 'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that
probable cause existed." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 271 (1960)).
39. The grand jury is empanelled to investigate criminal activity. It consists of up to 23
individuals and is charged with the responsibility of determining whether probable cause
exists that a crime occurred and that the person being accused committed the charged of-
fense. The grand jury is "not textually assigned ... to any of the branches [of government],"
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992), and stands between the accuser and the
accused as "a primary security to the innocent against hasty, malicious[,] and oppressive
persecution." Woods v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). See generally Mark Kadish,
Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Proc-
ess, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1996) (advocating a balance between the efficiency of law
enforcement and the secrecy of grand juries).
The Fifth Amendment provides, "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital,
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The grand jury must find probable cause that a crime has been committed
before it returns an indictment formally charging an individual. This fact-
finding is done in a closed proceeding to protect the privacy interests of
both the accused and the witnesses. Therefore, societal goals, in conjunction
with inherent checks and balances of the justice system, provide a frame-
work in which courts can balance competing access interests at the pre-
indictment stage of the justice process. This framework alleviates the need
to apply ridged access tests drawn from other stages in the justice process,
such as a First Amendment test.
40
C. Down the Line in the Justice Process
Following the pre-indictment stage, a case can have two different
paths, depending upon whether an indictment is entered. What are the inter-
ests of the individual, government, and public in access to search warrant
materials in these different situations?
1. Post-Indictment/Trial
If criminal charges are filed, new interests and rights of the parties at-
tach. At this stage the defendant has been charged with a crime and his or
her interest in defending against this charge is substantial. The information
contained in the search warrant, affidavit, and return is key to seeking the
suppression of evidence and is provided by the government as part of rou-
tine discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 41 The public
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment has been construed to apply only to felony of-
fenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (2000); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 354-55 (1886).
In order for a charge to be valid, there must be concurrence between the grand jury and the
prosecuting authority. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1965).
An alternative to being charged by a grand jury's return of indictment is the swear-
ing of a criminal complaint by the prosecutor. Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3,
a "complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged"
that must be given under oath before an authorized judge. FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 (amended
2002). Before the complaint can be used to arrest an individual, a judge must issue an arrest
warrant or summons for that individual. In so doing, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 4
requires the judge to find that the documents submitted by the government "establish prob-
able cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed
it." FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 (amended 2002). Even if an individual is arrested on the complaint
and warrant, in order for the government to continue with the prosecution, the matter must be
presented to the grand jury if it involves a felony offense. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40. See discussion infra Part IV.
41. Search warrants and affidavits are produced, generally, under Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E), requiring the government to produce for inspection or copy-
ing all documents and tangible items it intends to use in its case in chief or that are material
to preparing the defense. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E) (amended 2002); see also Id.
12(b)(4)(B) (amended 2002) (defendant may demand notice of intent to use evidence that
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may also request search warrant information post-indictment. Public disclo-
sure, however, may raise a Sixth Amendment issue regarding the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial.42 In determining access, the courts must engage in
balancing the three interests at this stage as well.43
Additionally, justice information in the trial stage is often requested by
the public under a qualified First Amendment right to access criminal trials,
pursuant to which courts can deny access if they find that the government
has a compelling interest and the denial of access is narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.44 Although the Supreme Court has not extended this First
Amendment qualified right of access to the right to review documents in
criminal matters, circuit courts have applied the qualified right of access in
this manner.45 A right of access to post indictment judicial records, although
46not absolute, is also afforded by a common-law right of access.
may be subject to a motion to suppress).
42. United States v. Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198-99 (D. R.I. 2001), explaining that
although the government raises no objection to the disclosure of the search warrant materials,
[t]he defendants continue to object to the Journal's motion claiming that the affidavit is
replete with unsubstantiated opinions, hearsay, and partisan commentary. They argue that
any "right" of access the Journal may have is outweighed by the likelihood that publication
of the affidavit will prejudice their Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. Id. The court held
that the right to a fair trial outweighed the right to pre-trial access to the search documents
and that the alternative of delaying release until after trial commenced was appropriate. Id.
43. In Cianci, the court weighed the competing interests of the individual, the govern-
ment, and the public in deciding whether disclosure of the search warrant affidavits would
compromise the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 202-04. A number of factors unique to
search warrant affidavits are taken into consideration, including: (1) the purpose of the affi-
davit-to persuade the court that the subject has committed a crime and should be further
investigated; (2) the fact that affidavits are not prepared by attorneys and are not subject to
the rules barring attorneys from making public statements that may prejudice the defendant's
trial; (3) the notion that the affidavit is not restricted to facts, but may contain opinions, con-
clusions, and information on tangential matters; (4) the fact that affidavits often contain
hearsay; (5) the ability to file the documents ex parte, affording the defendant no opportunity
to challenge their contents. Id.
44. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 457 U.S.
596, 606-07 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580-81 (1980).
45. See, e.g., In re Time, Inc., 182 F.3d 270, 271 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing In re Wash.
Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 388-90 (4th Cir. 1986)); Seattle Times Co. v. United States Dist.
Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Associated Press v. United States Dist.
Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983)); CBS, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 765
F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Gonzalez, 927 F. Supp. 768, 783 (D. Del.
1996) (holding First Amendment qualified right of access applies to post-trial documents);
but see, In re Search of 1993 Jeep Grand Cherokee, Nos. 96-91M, 96-92M, 96-93M, 1996
WL 768293, at *9 (D. Del. Oct. 11, 1996) (finding "no constitutional right of access to pre-
indictment warrants and supporting documents (under] the First Amendment") (emphasis
added).




In some cases, the prosecutor may not seek or the grand jury may not
return an indictment. This can result from mootness of the case, due to the
death of the defendant, the expiration of the statute of limitations, 47 or the
granting of immunity to the subject.48 It may also result because of insuffi-
cient evidence to charge a particular target or the grand jury's decision not
to indict. In these situations, the interests of the three groups remain but may
vary in importance. For example, the government may have no ongoing
related criminal investigation.49 Therefore, non-disclosure of the search war-
rant documents may no longer be an important law enforcement interest. On
the other hand, the documents may contain witness names and law en-
forcement procedures that the government has an interest in preserving or
information pertinent to investigation of another individual. In these situa-
tions the government may seek to maintain the sealing of these documents. °
Similarly, the target or another affected individual has an ongoing pri-
vacy interest in the information contained in the search warrant documents.
He or she may seek to keep this information from public disclosure.51 In the
case where the target or affected individual is deceased, however, his or her
individual interest may no longer exist.
5 2
47. The statute of limitations is the period of time in which the government is permitted
to bring charges. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2231 (1986). Gener-
ally, the statute of limitations is five years although there are special rules extending limita-
tions for certain types of offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282-96. (2002). There is no statute of
limitations for a capital case. Id. § 3281 (2002).
48. Only the Executive branch has authority to grant immunity from prosecution. See In
re Perlin, 589 F.2d 260, 269 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that the court's function in reviewing
government's request is ministerial); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1219 (4th Cir. 1973) (indi-
cating that the sole function of the court is to ascertain whether there is compliance with the
statute). A grant of immunity is one form of plea bargaining and is provided for by statute.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (2002).
Other types of plea bargains may also result in no indictment by the grand jury. The
subject and the government may agree that the subject will plead guilty to a certain charge
and allow the government to pursue that charge by directly filing the charge in court-that is,
by waiving his Fifth Amendment right to indictment. In this latter situation, the relative
interest of the groups is the same as if charges are brought through grand jury indictment. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
49. See Application of Newsday Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (explaining that
the government asserted no ongoing investigation or interest in keeping the search warrant
material closed, and it withdrew its objection to unsealing portions of the search warrant
affidavit).
50. See In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (N.D. Ga. 1996) (holding
that it is appropriate to keep details of a bomb device under seal to aid the government in
assessing credibility of subsequent information and to promote a compelling interest in the
identification and prosecution of an actual perpetrator).
51. See Gunn 11, 895 F.2d 460, 466 (8th Cir. 1990).
52. The issue of whether an affected person's privacy interest in search warrant materi-
als survives his death has not been specifically addressed. The Supreme Court, however, has
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The public's interest may also assume a variety of forms, including
need for law enforcement accountability, desire for access in order to re-
solve curiosity, or no interest in the search warrant documents at all.
In balancing these interests, the court must determine how the justice
landscape has changed given that there is no continuing investigation and no
criminal charges will be filed. Many courts find that the disclosure interest,
whether to the target individual or the public, is the most salient at this time
in the justice process.53
found that "an attorney-client privilege survives the death of [a] client, who 'may be con-
cemed about reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to friends [and] family."' Accuracy
in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194 F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Swindler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998)). Additionally, under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA), courts have held that exemption 7(C), which allows for non-disclosure of
"records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes" where material "could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," may be
asserted by a third party, usually a family member. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)(C) (2002); see, e.g.,
Schrecker v. United States Dept. of Justice, 254 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that
death diminishes the interest, but by no means extinguishes it); Favish v. Office of Indep.
Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding "that the personal privacy in the
statutory exemption extend to the memory of the deceased held by those tied closely to the
deceased by blood or love and therefore that the expectable invasion of their privacy caused
by the release of records made for law enforcement must be balanced against the public
purpose to be served by disclosure"); Accuracy in Media, 194 F.3d at 122-23. These cases
involve privacy interests specifically protected by evidentiary rule or federal statute (i.e.,
attorney-client privilege and FOIA), and thus are treated differently than other interests. See
Campbell v. United States Dept. of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that
"analysis of privacy under FOIA often differs from similar analysis in other areas of the
law"). Interests in search warrant materials, generally, are not in a constitutionally or other-
wise protected category of interests. Long v. Am. Red Cross, 145 F.R.D. 658, 666 (S.D.
Ohio 1993) (holding that "the law does not generally recognize that any third party, even a
close family member, has a legally protectable interest in keeping private information known
about another family member, other than perhaps in the context of the marital privilege");
see supra note 13.
What clearly remains of the decedent's interest, however, is any property interest
associated with items seized during the execution of a warrant. This property interest may be
raised by the decedent's estate.
53. See In re Search Warrant Executed Feb. 1, 1995, No. M18-65 (RJW), 1995 WL
406276 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1995) (quoting In re Searches of Semtex Indus. Corp., 876 F.
Supp. 426, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)) (noting that disclosure to the subject "should not be post-
poned indefinitely" where the grand jury has not returned an indictment in a reasonable
time). The Southern District of Ohio considered two different interests in a case that had
been concluded through a plea agreement. See In re Search Warrant, No. M-3-94-80, 1996
WL 1609166, at *3-5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 1996). In this case the subject of the search war-
rant argued for continued closure after entering a guilty plea. Id. at 3. He specifically sought
to have information contained in the search warrant documents that did not relate to his plea
remain sealed, noting that he was not charged with these accusations, and they should not be
tried in the "court of public opinion." Id. The court rejected this argument, finding that the
disclosure did not affect any Sixth Amendment right of petitioner and that his interest in
reputational harm did not outweigh the public's interest in disclosure. Id. In addition, the
petitioner argued that names and identifying information of other individuals contained in the
search warrant documents should remain sealed. Id. The court found that the rights of inno-
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V. CIRCUIT COURT TESTS FOR ACCESS TO SEARCH WARRANT MATERIALS
Given the fluidity of the justice system and varying interests at each
stage of the justice process, the blanket application of static access tests fails
to balance adequately the individual, government, and public interests with
societal goals. As seen in the review of circuit and district court decisions
below, however, courts continue to ignore the nuances of the justice process
and seek to apply ridged access procedures based on First Amendment or
common law access tests drawn from post-indictment stages of the justice
process.
Since the late 1980s, public and individual access to search warrant
documents filed with the court pre-indictment has been the subject of vari-
ous circuit court opinions. Widespread consideration of this issue began in
1988, when the United States Department of Justice initiated a nationwide
investigation of defense contract fraud. In June 1988 the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Naval Investigative Services executed more than forty
search warrants at various locations around the country, including the East-
ern District of Missouri (St. Louis), the Southern and Central Districts of
California (San Diego and Los Angeles, respectively), and the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York (Brooklyn). Requests by media organizations for access
to the search warrant documents in these districts led to four court of ap-
peals decisions regarding access to search warrant material. The circuit de-
cisions are not consistent, and have generated confusion that continues to
this day.
A. Gunn I
The first of these decisions was In re Search Warrant for the Secretar-
ial Area Outside Office of Gunn ('Gunn ,,). 54 Following the execution of
two warrants at McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC), the government
filed, unsealed, the search warrant for the secretarial area, the description of
the property to be seized, and the receipt for the property actually seized.
The government filed a motion to seal the search warrant for Gunn's office,
the affidavits for the search warrants, and all other material. The court
granted the motion. Later, Pulitzer Publishing Company, publisher of the St.
Louis Dispatch, filed a motion seeking access to the sealed material. The
district court determined that there was both a First Amendment right of
access to the material and a common law right of access, although neither
right was absolute. The court unsealed certain portions where the govern-
ment did not oppose access, but denied the request to unseal the remaining
cent third parties may overcome the presumption of the public's right to access, where the
information was not already public. Id. Such names were ordered redacted from the materi-
als. Id.
54. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
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portions, finding that continued closure was necessary to maintain integrity
of the government's investigation.55 No charges had been brought against
any defendant at the time.
In a split decision, two of the three appellate judges determined that a
First Amendment right of access to search warrant documents existed,56 but
that the right was qualified and closure warranted if "closure is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to that interest. '57 Two
judges also determined that access to the material in this instance was not
warranted because the government's investigation was ongoing, and the
government had a legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of the in-
vestigation. 58 To understand the holding, and how each of the judges arrived
at his conclusions, requires further inspection.
Judge McMillan wrote the opinion for the court. Working from United
States Supreme Court cases, Judge McMillan noted that the First Amend-
ment protects a right of the public and the press to attend criminal trials and
pre-trial hearings.59 Further, the determination as to whether a First
Amendment right of access extends to a particular proceeding called for an
examination of "whether the place and process have historically been open
to the press and general public[,] and whether public access plays a signifi-
cant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.' 6 °
This is referred to throughout case law as the "First Amendment test."
Judge McMillan applied the First Amendment test to reach a novel
conclusion. He correctly noted that search warrants are issued in an ex parte
closed proceeding and that to do otherwise would frustrate the very objec-
tive of the search warrant process. He concluded, however, that the com-
plainant, Pulitzer Publishing, did not want access to the issuing process, but
55. Id. at 571.
56. Id. at 575-76. Judges McMillan and Heaney. The third judge, Judge Bowman,
found it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment issue. Id.
57. Id. at 574 (quoting In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987)).
58. Id. at 574-75. Judges McMillan and Bowman. Id. Judge Heaney dissented as to
continued closure. In his view the governmental interest in its ongoing investigation was
minimal. According to him, the subjects probably already knew of the nature and scope of
the investigation. In addition, there had already been disclosure of information from other
sources, and the interest of the taxpayers to know of the investigative details outweighed any
interest in closure because the investigation involved allegations of procurement fraud in the
defense industry. As he put it,
I note that the defense contract and procurement scandal in this country repre-
sents a public concern of great immediacy and magnitude ... Certainly the in-
terest of the nation's taxpayers is such that they are entitled to know the full de-
tails of the procurement fraud as soon as possible in order to intelligently act on
the matter.
Id. at 576 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
59. See id. at 573 (citing Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982)
(discussing the right to attend criminal trials); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1,
10 (1986) ("Press-Enterprise 11") (discussing access to pre-trial hearings)).
60. Gunn L 855 F.2d at 573 (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8).
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to the documents utilized in that process. Judge McMillan distinguished
between the process and the documents and found that a First Amendment
right exists to access the documents, because the documents were filed with
the clerk of the court and were filed without being sealed. In reaching his
conclusion, Judge McMillan noted that the Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed the issue of a First Amendment right of access to judicial docu-
ments, citing Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,6 1 to support the
proposition that judicial records historically have been open to public in-
spection.
As to the second prong of the First Amendment test, Judge McMillan
concluded that access to the documents was important to the public's under-
standing of the function and operation of the judicial process and the crimi-
nal justice system. He also found that access was important to curb prosecu-
torial or judicial misconduct.62
Notwithstanding that Judge McMillan found a First Amendment right
of access, he concluded that the search documents should remain sealed in
their entirety. He found that the government had a compelling interest in the
ongoing investigation that overrode the public's access interest. He noted
that the documents described the investigation in considerable detail, in-
cluded information obtained by wiretaps and from informants, and revealed
the nature, scope and direction of the investigation. Thus, he concluded that
"[t]here is substantial probability that the . . . investigation would be se-
verely compromised if the sealed documents were released.,
63
Judge Heaney agreed with Judge McMillan regarding the existence of
a First Amendment right; however, he viewed the government interest in
maintaining closure as minimal. As Judge Heaney saw it, the subjects of the
investigation likely already knew of the investigation and only the general
public remained uninformed. Because the allegations involved a serious
matter of public concern, the public was "entitled to know the full details of
the [investigation] as soon as possible in order to intelligently act on the
matter. ''64
Finally, Judge Bowman, though rejecting the application of the First
Amendment test, sided with Judge McMillan regarding the overwhelming
governmental interest in continued closure. To him it was significant that
61. 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In Nixon, however, the Supreme Court applied only a common
law right of access to documents admitted as evidence in a criminal trial. Id. at 597-98. In
Nixon, the news media sought copies of tape recordings that had been admitted as exhibits in
a criminal trial. The district court denied the media the right to have their own copies, and
they appealed. The Supreme Court upheld the denial of copies and in so doing analyzed the
case under common law doctrine. Id. at 598-99.
62. Gunn 1, 855 F.2d at 573.
63. Id. at 574.
64. Id. at 576 (Heaney, J., concurring and dissenting).
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the matter was addressed prior to any charges being filed. He also acknowl-
edged the public interest in knowing facts produced by an uncompromised
investigation, the public interest in the successful prosecution of anyone
who had defrauded the government, and the public interest in fairness to any
innocent persons who were linked to the investigation in the search warrant
documents. 65 To Judge Bowman the justification for continued closure was
so overwhelming regardless of the applicable standard that it made it unnec-
essary to address the constitutional issue of whether a First Amendment
right existed.
B. Gunn 1
Following the decision in Gunn I, Pulitzer Publishing renewed its mo-
tion for access, and the government withdrew its objection to release of the
documents. The district court redacted certain portions of the search warrant
materials and ordered them released. MDC, Gunn, and several unidentified
individuals intervened and appealed the disclosure. Pulitzer Publishing
cross-appealed the court's refusal to release the entirety of the documents.
The case went to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
styled as Certain Interested Individuals, John Does I- V v. Pulitzer Publish-
ing Co. ("Gunn I/).
66
Judge McMillan again wrote the opinion, this time for a unanimous
court. Even though no indictments had been returned, the government's
interest in continued closure no longer existed because, according to the
government, its investigative objectives had been achieved. Gunn, MDC,
and the unidentified individuals claimed that they had a constitutional right
to privacy that outweighed any qualified right of access. The court agreed
noting that "the procedural process of the government's criminal investiga-
tion must be considered in the balancing process and that the absence of an
indictment weighs heavily in favor of the privacy interests and non-
disclosure. 67 Indeed, the absence of an indictment was dispositive:
[w]here no indictments have issued against persons ... there is a clear
suggestion that, whatever their truth, the Government cannot prove these
allegations. The court of public opinion is not the place to seek to prove
them. If the Government has such proof, it should be submitted to a
grand jury, an institution developed to protect all citizens from un-
founded charges.
68
65. Id. at 575 (Bowman, J., concurring).
66. 895 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1990).
67. Id. at 466.
68. Id. (quoting United States v. Ferie, 563 F. Supp. 252, 254 (D. R.I. 1983)).
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Because the warrant material could seriously damage the reputation of
the named individuals and leave them no forum in which they could seek
possible vindication, the court found that not even the release of a redacted
version of the material was warranted.69
C. Times Mirror, Baltimore Sun, and Application of Newsday, Inc.
No other circuit court has agreed with Gunn I in finding a First
Amendment right of access to search warrant material. Two circuits have
specifically rejected the existence of a First Amendment right, and one cir-
cuit has found it unnecessary to address the access issue under a constitu-
tional analysis.
The two circuit cases rejecting the First Amendment right were de-
cided between the decisions in Gunn I and Gunn II; Times Mirror Co. v.
United States70 and Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz.
71
In Times Mirror, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit was presented with essentially the same issue the Eighth Circuit consid-
ered in Gunn L The news media sought access to search warrant material
concerning the defense contractor fraud scheme that was the subject of
Gunn I and Gunn II. Access was sought with regard to warrants that had
been issued in San Diego and Los Angeles. The cases were consolidated for
appeal. In each case the government initially obtained an order sealing the
warrant material. In the San Diego case, the magistrate denied the request to
unseal the material, and the district court affirmed on appeal. In the Los
Angeles case, the magistrate granted the request to unseal. The government
obtained a stay pending appeal to the district court, which reversed the mag-
istrate.72 Thus, each matter before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was
one in which the news media was seeking to overturn a district court ruling.
As in Gunn I and Gunn II, the request for access pre-dated the filing of
charges against any person or entity.
The Times Mirror court rejected both the existence of a First Amend-
ment right and access as a common law right and criticized the holding of
Gunn I. As to the First Amendment, the court followed the same test that
the Eighth Circuit utilized-whether the process was open historically and
69. Pursuant to a First Amendment analysis, the restriction to access must be narrowly
tailored to address the closure interest. In Gunn 1, the court concluded that no amount of
redaction could be tailored to allow release of a portion of the documents while preserving
the government's compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its investigation. See Gunn
1, 855 F.2d at 574. Similarly, the court in Gunn II, 895 F.2d at 466, found redaction would
not adequately protect the privacy interests asserted.
70. 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989).
71. 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
72. Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appeal lies to the district court
from a ruling issued by a magistrate. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(g)(2) (amended 2002).
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whether public access would play a "significant positive role in the func-
tioning of the ... process. 73 Like the Eighth Circuit, the court acknowl-
edged that, historically, the warrant issuing process was secret. Unlike the
Eighth Circuit, however, the court rejected the notion that there was a mean-
ingful distinction between the process of issuing the warrant and the docu-
ments. The court noted that access to warrant material was routinely re-
stricted upon government request with the courts being highly deferential to
the government's determination that an investigation required secrecy.74
As to whether public access would play a significant role, the court re-
jected the media's argument that access would promote self-governance
through discussion and a check on potential government abuses, promote
integrity of the criminal process, and serve the same therapeutic value as
open criminal trials. The court found the argument unpersuasive because the
assertions are true of every judicial process.75 Instead the court concluded
that access would hinder the process by risking (1) the destruction of evi-
dence; (2) flight of a criminal suspect; (3) obstruction of justice; and (4)
coordination of false stories. 7 6 In supporting its conclusion, the court com-
pared the investigative process to the grand jury policy of secrecy, stating:
[i]f proceedings before and related to evidence presented to a grand jury
... can be kept secret, afortiori, matters relating to a criminal investiga-
tion leading to the development of evidence to be presented to a grand
jury may also be kept secret. Indeed, search warrant proceedings are one
step back from the convening of a grand jury.
7 7
The court concluded that the First Amendment provided no qualified
right of access to warrant proceedings and materials.
The court also concluded that there was no common law right of access
when "there is neither a history of access nor an important public need justi-
fying access. 78 Thus, for access to be granted, the party seeking access had
to make a threshold showing that disclosure would serve the ends of jus-
tice.79
The court also addressed the privacy issues unaddressed by Gunn L8O
As the Ninth Circuit reasoned, the privacy interests compelled the same
73. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1213 (quoting Press-Enterprise H, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
74. Id. at 1214.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1215.
77. Id. at 1215-16 (quoting In re Sealed Search Warrants and Affidavits, Criminal No.
H-88-0427, oral opinion at 12-13 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 1988)).
78. Id. at 1219.
79. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219.
80. In Gunn II, 895 F.2d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1990), the Eighth Circuit noted the Times
Mirror decision and its disagreement with Gunn I. Whether the discussion of privacy issues
in Times Mirror influenced the decision in Gunn H that privacy interests justified continued
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conclusion. Part of the policy behind grand jury secrecy was to protect the
innocent accused from disclosure to the public that he or she was under in-
vestigation. Similarly, privacy interests had been the dispositive reason for
closure of some judicial documents following the indictment of at least one
person, such as bills of particular naming unindicted co-conspirators.
81
The Ninth Circuit found the reasoning in Gunn I fundamentally
flawed. In particular, the Ninth Circuit criticized the claimed distinction
between the issuing process and the documents, noting "[t]he warrant proc-
ess-which Judge McMillan acknowledges would be jeopardized if warrant
proceedings were conducted openly-would be equally threatened if the in-
formation disclosed during the proceeding were open to public scrutiny,
since in either case disclosure could frustrate the government's efforts to
investigate criminal activity.,
82
Moreover, Times Mirror criticized the Eighth Circuit's notion that be-
cause the search warrant materials may become the subject of a pre-trial
suppression motion, a right to public access existed. The Ninth Circuit noted
that,
[w]hile warrant material may, in due course, be disclosed to a defendant
so she can challenge the constitutionality of the search at a suppression
hearing at which the public has a First Amendment right of access, it
does not follow that the public should necessarily have access to the in-
formation before that time.
8 3
As the Ninth Circuit so aptly observed, the same notion could be ad-
vanced regarding evidence presented to a grand jury, yet there is unequivo-
cally no right of access to that material.
84
Also after Gunn I but before Gunn II, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit rejected a First Amendment right of access ar-
gument in Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz.85 In Baltimore Sun, the underlying
investigation concerned allegations of organized crime involvement in the
health care industry. Again, the matter arose as a result of a news media
request after the execution of a search warrant but prior to the filing of for-
mal charges, The warrant itself and the return inventory had been unsealed,
so the remaining question concerned the affidavit in support of the search
warrant. The district court had denied the request on the basis that the pub-
lic's interest in effective criminal investigation outweighed the news me-
dia's interest to access.
closure cannot be discerned.
81. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1217.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1217-18 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 1218 n.10.
85. 886 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
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The Fourth Circuit disposed of the First Amendment issue quickly,
finding "[t]he Sun's claim of a [F]irst [A]mendment right of access to the
affidavit fails because it does not satisfy the first prong of the test," or
whether the place and the process historically have been open to the press.
86
On the other hand, for the general public the Fourth Circuit found a
clear common law right of access. The qualified common law right was
committed to the sound discretion of the issuing judicial officer and re-
viewed on appeal for abuse of discretion.87 The Fourth Circuit noted the
important distinction stating:
[t]he distinction between the rights afforded by the first amendment and
those afforded by the common law is significant. A first amendment
right of access can be denied only by proof of a 'compelling governmen-
tal interest' and proof that the denial is 'narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.' In contrast, under the common law the decision to grant or
deny access is 'left to the sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion
to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the
particular case.'
88
Notwithstanding this distinction, the court created confusion by hold-
ing that a judicial officer may only deny access "when sealing is essential to
preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest ''89-
essentially a First Amendment standard for determining access.
90
The final decision was that of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in In re Application of Newsday, Inc.9' The warrant at
issue was, again, arising from a news media request for access to search
warrant materials in the defense contract fraud investigation addressed in
Gunn I and Times Mirror. Procedurally, however, Newsday was quite dif-
ferent. The defendant in Newsday had already pleaded guilty, and the gov-
ernment did not oppose disclosure of the warrant material. The defendant
opposed disclosure and the district court agreed to release redacted docu-
ments, removing references to third parties not subject to criminal investiga-
tion. The defendant appealed, but Newsday did not.
The court took the same approach as Judge Bowman in his concurring
opinion in Gunn I, finding that since the matter could be adequately ad-
86. Id. at 64.
87. Id. at 65.
88. Id. at 64 (internal citations omitted).
89. Id. at 65-66 (quoting Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)
("Press-Enterprise T')).
90. By the time the appeal was heard several indictments had been issued and the affi-
davit had been unsealed. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 63. Thus, there was no need for the
court to discuss privacy interests and it did not do so. Id.
91. 895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1990).
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dressed without reaching the constitutional question of whether a First
Amendment right of access existed, the court should not reach that issue.
The court found that access was warranted under a common law right where
"the warrant has been executed, a plea-bargain agreement has been reached,
the government admits that its need for secrecy is over, and the time has
arrived for filing the application with the clerk. ''92 The court also found that
the common law right of access was qualified by privacy interests of the
persons affected, but that the lower court had adequately taken those inter-
ests into account by redacting sensitive material.93
By 1990 three circuits had rendered opinions on access to search war-
rant material, but no other circuits have addressed this issue to date. The
conflict still remains between application of the First Amendment test, the
common law access test, and the need to apply either of these tests in de-
termining pre-indictment access to such materials.
VI. THE DISTRICT COURTS WADE INTO THE CONFUSION
In those circuits where the Courts of Appeals have not addressed the
question, none of the district courts have adopted a First Amendment analy-
sis for access to search warrant material. Some have reserved ruling on the
First Amendment, 94 while others have specifically rejected it.95 Most of the
92. Id. at 79.
93. Id. A primary argument in Newsday focused on the inclusion of information ob-
tained through wiretaps in the warrant documents. Id. The court rejected the defendant's
argument that the wiretap statute prohibited disclosure of the warrant documents. Id. Instead,
the court viewed the inclusion of such material as a fact that required careful review by the
judge before releasing the materials. Id.
94. In re Search Warrants in Connection with Investigation of Columbia/HCA Health-
care Corp. in El Paso, Tex., 971 F. Supp. 251, 253 (W.D. Tex. 1997); In re Search of Office
Suites for World and Islam Studies Enter., 925 F. Supp. 738, 742 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
95. In re Macon Tel. Publ'g. Co., 900 F. Supp. 489, 491-92 (M.D. Ga. 1995):
Certain things are kept quiet, and usually for good reasons. We do not allow the
public access to jury deliberations (jurors would not be as willing to speak their
minds, hence litigants would be deprived of a fair trial); the public may be
barred from juvenile matters (transgressions of youth should not be publicized,
and thus follow us for the remainder of our days); nor is the public allowed ac-
cess to the grand jury (compromise of the cornerstone of the American criminal
justice system). The inherent nature in the last of these examples ... simply pre-
cludes the extension of First Amendment rights to public access in every in-
stance. The very nature of the grand jury proceeding, and investigative proceed-
ings generally, is secretive. To compromise that aspect of the object is to destroy
the thing itself. The court refuses to find the existence of a right that would in
some circumstances possibly destroy institutions ... so valuable and necessary
to society.
Id. at 492. See also United States v. Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d 194, 200 (D. R.I. 2001); United
States v. Sealed Search Warrants. Nos. 99-1096. 99-1097. 99-1098. 1999 WL 1455215. at *5
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district courts have employed the general common law formulation in Bal-
timore Sun v. Goetz: the determination of whether access should be permit-
ted requires balancing of the respective rights and is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court or issuing judge.96
Like Baltimore Sun, some of the courts have intermingled the constitu-
tional standard appropriate for the First Amendment with the common law
test by requiring that the party seeking closure demonstrate a compelling
reason for closure.97 Or, as stated in Baltimore Sun, "access [may be denied]
when ... [it] is 'essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored
to serve that interest."'
98
In nearly every instance, access to search warrant materials is denied
when there is an ongoing investigation and no charges have been brought.
The justification for denial, or the interests that outweigh the presumptive
right of access, have included potential compromise of the ongoing investi-
gation,99 public interest in a full and complete factual basis for investiga-
(D. N.J. Sept. 2, 1999); United States v. Certain Real Prop. Located in Romulus, Wayne
County, Mich., 977 F. Supp. 833, 835-36 (E.D. Mich. 1997); In re Four Search Warrants,
945 F. Supp. 1563, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1996); In re Search Warrant, No. M-3-94-80, 1996 WL
1609166, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20 1996); In re Search of Eyecare Physicians of Am., 910
F. Supp. 414,415 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
96. Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 201; Sealed Search Warrants, 1999 WL 1455215, at *4;
In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. at 1568; In re Search Warrant, 1996 WL
1609116, at *10; In re Search of Office Suites for World and Islam Studies Enter., 925 F.
Supp. at 742; In re Search of Eyecare Physicians of Am., 910 F. Supp. at 415 n.2.
97. Certain Real Property Located in Romulus, Wayne County, Mich., 977 F. Supp. at
836 (discussing a strong presumption of access unless documents are submitted under seal);
In re Search Warrant, 1996 WL 1609116, at * 10 (recognizing a strong presumption of ac-
cess); In re Documents 1, 2, and 3 the Search Warrant and Supporting Affidavits Relating to
Theordore John Kaczynski, United States v. Kaczynski, No. MCR 96-6-H-CCL, 1996 WL
343429, at *3 (D. Mont. Apr. 10, 1996); In re Search of Office Suites for World and Islam
Studies Enter., 925 F. Supp. at 742.
98. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 65-66 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510)
(1984)). The imposition of this "compelling interest" is inconsistent with the distinction
between the common law standard and the First Amendment standard because it requires the
same level of balancing. See In re Search Warrant, 1996 WL 1609166, at *10 n. 11. More
appropriately, the analysis should be as set forth in Sealed Search Warrants, 1999 WL
1455215, at *4, stating:
[t]he same policy considerations are at work in applying both a First Amend-
ment and a common-law analysis. Although the interests are the same, rather
than applying the 'compelling interest' standard used under the First Amend-
ment, a court must balance the strength of the common law right to view judicial
records against the [competing] interests ....
See also In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. at 1566 n.4.
99. Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 202; Sealed Search Warrants, 1999 WL 1455215, at *6-
7; In re Search Warrants in Connection with Investigation of ColumbiaHCA Healthcare
Corp. in El Paso, Tex., 971 F. Supp. at 253; Kaczynski, 1996 WL 343429, at * 3; In re
Search of Office Suites for World and Islam Studies Enter., 925 F. Supp. at 743; In re Search
of Eyecare Physicians ofAm., 910 F. Supp. at 416.
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tion,'00 the public interest in the successful prosecution of those who com-
mit crimes,101 preservation of grand jury secrecy,'0 2 protection of govern-
ment informants, 0 3 the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to a fair
trial, 10 4 and the privacy interests of either a subject or a third party.1
0 5
VII. THE INADEQUACY OF GUNNI, TIMES MIRROR, AND BALTIMORE SUN
Each of the circuit court cases addressing pre-indictment access to
search warrant materials is flawed in its analysis: Gunn rs flaw lies in dis-
tinguishing between the "warrant issuing process" and the "documents"
created; Times Mirror's flaw lies in failing to distinguish between the exis-
tence of a qualified right of access and the test to see whether that qualified
right prevails in a specific context; and Baltimore Sun's flaw lies in blend-
ing a First Amendment standard with common law access test.
106
A. Issuing Process Versus Documents
Gunn I found the existence of a First Amendment right by concluding
that documents which are filed with the court are, and historically have
been, open to the public. 0 7 Thus, according to Gunn I, even though the
process of issuing those documents is, and historically has been, closed, the
100. Sealed Search Warrants, 1999 WL 1455215, at *6-7; In re Macon Tel. Publ'g Co.,
900 F. Supp. at 493.
101. In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. at 1570; In re Macon Tel. Publ'g Co.,
900 F. Supp. at 493.
102. Sealed Search Warrants, 1999 WL 1455215, at *6; In re Search of Eyecare Physi-
cians ofAm., 910 F. Supp. at 416. See also In re Search Warrant Executed Feb. 1, 1995, No.
M-18-65 (RJW), 1995 WL 406276, at *3 (S.D.N.Y July 7, 1995).
103. In re Search Warrants in Connection with Investigation of Columbia/HCA Health-
care Corp., in El Paso, Tex., 971 F. Supp. at 253; In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp.
at 1570-71; In re Search of Office Suites for World and Islam Studies Enter., 925 F. Supp. at
743.
104. Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 202; contra, In re Search of Office Suites for World and
Islam Studies Enter., 925 F. Supp. at 743 n.4.
105. Cianci, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 203; Sealed Search Warrants, 1999 WL 1455215, at *7;
In re Search Warrant, No. M-3-94-80, 1996 WL 1609166, at *11-12 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20,
1996); In re Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 900 F. Supp. at 492-93; In re Search of Eyecare Physi-
cians of Am., 910 F. Supp. at 416. Contra, In re Search of Office Suites for World and Islam
Studies Enter., 925 F. Supp. at 743 n.4; Kaczynski, 1996 WL 343429, at * 2-3.
106. In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1990), has perhaps the
most accurate analysis. Newsday involved access following a guilty plea by the principal
subject, however, rather than access in a pre-indictment context by an affected party or the
public. Id.
107. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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"historically open access" prong for finding the existence of a First
Amendment right was satisfied. 1
08
The document/process distinction is meaningless and indefensible.
Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the entire
basis for issuance of the warrant must be contained in the papers or recorded
by the court. It is rare that the issuance of a search warrant involves re-
corded oral testimony. More commonly the judge reviews the warrant, the
application, and the probable cause affidavit and renders a decision based
on the information included in these written instruments. The filing and
review of the documents is essentially the "process" in issuing search war-
rants.
Moreover, adherence to the document/process distinction has resulted
in a tortured analysis to comply with the dictates of Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc. 109 and Gunn I. For example, in United States v. McDou-
gal," 10 President Clinton was permitted to testify in a criminal trial by video
deposition rather than in person. The media sought a copy of his video
deposition much as the media had sought copies of the tapes of President
Nixon in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. The district applied Nixon
and denied access. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court and held
that the videotape was not a judicial document."' Thus, according to the
court, the case was distinguishable from Gunn I, and the Nixon common law
access standard applied. 12 The Eighth Circuit's application of Nixon's
common law access test in McDougal and its application of a First Amend-
ment test in Gunn I fails to appropriately consider what is occurring in the
justice process. If, for example, only a qualified common law right to access
exists for documents admitted into evidence in a public criminal trial," 3
how can the greater First Amendment right of access exist for documents
presented in a closed ex parte proceeding, such as the issuance of a pre-
indictment search warrant?
108. Gunn 1, 855 F.2d 569, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1988). Gunn I applies the test found in
Press-Enterprise II, namely, "whether the place and process have historically been open to
the press and general public and whether public access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question." Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S.
1, 8 (1986)).
109. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
110. 103 F.3d 651 (8thCir. 1996).
111. Id. at 656.
112. Id. at 659, n.16.
113. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (recognizing
a qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal trials).
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B. Existence of a Common Law Right of Access Versus Application of a
Common Law Access Test
In Times Mirror, the court analyzed whether access should be granted
either on the basis of the First Amendment or the common law."l 4 The court
concluded that no access should be granted to the documents at the pre-
indictment stage of the justice process. The Ninth Circuit reasoned, how-
ever, that since the right of access is a "qualified right" under either test, if
no access was warranted there was no actual right of access at that juncture.
As set forth in Times Mirror, there is no distinction between the qualified
right of access and the application of a test to determine whether the right
prevails in a specific context.
This analysis is no more helpful in setting out a framework for balanc-
ing the competing interests than the document/process distinction of Gunn I.
A more preferable approach is articulated in In re Macon Telegraph Pub-
lishing Co., which found that "[a] common law right of public access exists
in all instances. Whether the public may exercise that right in a particular
context, or whether that right is outweighed by paramount concerns, is a
different question.""' 5
C. Blending the First Amendment Standard with the Common Law Ac-
cess Test
In Baltimore Sun, the Fourth Circuit unequivocally rejected the First
Amendment as the basis for an access analysis and explicitly recognized
that the common law test was more appropriately applied."16 Yet, in apply-
ing the common law test to the specifics of the case at hand, the court incor-
porated a portion of the First Amendment test-the standard from Press-
Enterprise I requiring that the restriction be "'narrowly tailored to serve [the
interest at issue]."" '
7
This approach is no more analytically correct or helpful than either
Gunn I or Times Mirror. As evidenced by the district court cases purporting
to follow Baltimore Sun, the application is a confusing mix of a simple bal-
ancing of the competing interests under the discretion of the issuing court
and a requirement that the party seeking closure establish a compelling in-
terest. 18
114. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989).
115. In re Macon Tel. Publ'g. Co., 900 F. Supp. 489, 491 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
116. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 64 (4th Cir. 1989); see supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
117. Baltimore Sun, 886 F.2d at 65 (quoting Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501, 510
(1984)).
118. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 25
ACCESS TO SEARCH WARRANT MATERIALS
The confusion created by the circuit decisions has filtered down to the
procedural level in the district courts. Because district courts are charged
with applying the access tests and standards, some have developed specific
sealing and disclosure procedures or rules for search warrant materials. One
example of such procedure is the sealing and disclosure rule used in the
Eastern District of Arkansas. The procedural flaws of the Eastern District of
Arkansas's general orders discussed below are not surprising given the
precedent of the circuit court analysis.
VIII. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE LAW AND ACCESS THEORY
Local courts have the authority to issue operating rules for the court,
usually referred to as general orders. 19 Until recently in the Eastern District
of Arkansas, General Order 22 was the rule governing pre-indictment access
to search warrant materials.120 In 2001 as a result of a media request for
access to pre-indictment search documents,' 2 1 the District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas reexamined its procedures for disclosure of
search warrant materials and found existing procedures faulty under Gunn L
Accordingly, the court adopted a new rule-Amended General Order 22. 122
Ideally, incorporating the law and theory discussed above, a well-
drafted court rule governing access to search warrant documents should (1)
provide a framework for balancing the differing interests of the individual,
the government, and the public; (2) provide some form of public notice that
search warrant documents exist; (3) provide a mechanism for requesting
access to or sealing of the documents; (4) assign a burden of proof for dem-
onstrating whether access should be granted; and (5) recognize that the
various interests change over time according to the status of the case in the
justice process.
Eastern District of Arkansas General Order 22 and Amended General
Order 22 are examples of attempts to institute practical procedures, based
on the common law and First Amendment access tests, to give appropriate
access to search warrant materials. Each of the rules succeeds in part and
fails in part in meeting the five objectives of the well-drafted rule.
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2000). General Orders govern the day-to-day operations of
the court. For example, Eastern District of Arkansas General Order 39 governs procedures
for assignment of cases among judges, and General Order 31 prohibits a judge's law clerk
from practicing before that judge for a period of two years after leaving his or her employ.
120. See infra Appendix A.
121. The matter concerned a search warrant executed on the residence of Carl Wilson.
During the execution of the search warrant, Mr. Wilson was shot and killed by law enforce-
ment.
122. See infra Appendix B.
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A. General Order 22
The former General Order 22 was drafted pre-Gunn I. Therefore, the
First Amendment test in Gunn I was not yet law in the Eighth Circuit. In a
common law context, General Order 22 met most but not all of the five ob-
jectives. First, it provided for automatic sealing of search warrant docu-
ments pre-indictment. In so doing it reflected a valid presumption that bal-
ancing the relative interests (individual, government, and public) favors
non-disclosure of search warrant materials pre-indictment (objectives 1 &
5). Second, it provided that, following the filing of charges, the search war-
rant documents would be placed in the open case file. This aspect of the rule
reflects the premise that the relative interests weigh in favor of access once
formal charges are filed (objective 5). Third, the rule provided a mechanism
for seeking access prior to charges being filed and assigned the burden of
persuasion (objectives 3 & 4). 123
General Order 22, however, failed to meet the five objectives in sev-
eral respects. First, it failed to provide notice to the public that a search war-
rant had been issued and that pertinent documents existed (objective 2).
Only directly affected parties would know to request access, thus failing to
recognize the general public's interest. 24 Second, General Order 22 did not
address circumstances that might warrant continued closure of the search
materials following the initiation of some, but not all possible, charges (ob-
jective 5). If, for example, one person was charged in an otherwise ongoing
investigation, there may be less justification for continued sealing as to that
person, but there may be ample justification for continued closure of infor-
mation in the ongoing investigation. 25 Continued sealing might be desired
and needed by the government or a subject individual.1 26 Moreover, the rule
failed to consider that even if full sealing may not be required, redaction of
certain parts of the search warrant documents may serve the interests of the
123. Specifically, the rule directed a person or entity seeking access to file a motion with
the issuing judicial officer. The motion was required to state good cause for the request.
Good cause, however, was presumed when the movant was a person directly affected by the
warrant. When an affected individual sought access, any party seeking continued sealing
carried the burden of showing why access should be denied.
124. This shortcoming of the rule could have been remedied by providing that the clerk
of court maintain a public docket that records the issuance of a search warrant but does so
without revealing any information other than the existence of a search warrant. For example,
the docket could simply reflect "In re Search" with the assigned unique magistrate number.
125. In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. 1563, 1565 (N.D. Ga. 1996). The potential
subject, Richard Jewell, was granted access to search warrant documents. Id. The court ini-
tially required, however, that he be prohibited from public disclosure. Id.
126. See id. (involving continued closure sought by government, but individual and me-
dia concurring as to media access); In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 75 (2d
Cir. 1990); Gunn I, 895 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir. 1990) (involving continued closure sought
by individual, but government and media concurring as to media access).
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various parties.' 27 Third, the mechanism for seeking access fails to consider
the disclosure implications of the actual motion to unseal or to continue
sealing (objective 3). In other words, it failed to explain to what extent
documents that are filed and hearings that are held to determine access to
the search warrant materials may be closed to the public or conducted in
camera. 128
Finally, as an operating rule in a then "common law access" jurisdic-
tion, General Order 22 was appropriate, but could have been more directive.
Specifically, in addition to assigning the burden of proof and the operation
of a presumption in certain circumstances, the operating rule could have
specified the test to be applied-that access requires a balancing of the
competing interests and is committed to the sound discretion of the deciding
judicial officer.
B. Amended General Order 22
In 2001 the Eastern District of Arkansas sought to bring General Order
22 in line with the Eighth Circuit decisions in Gunn I and Gunn II. Although
Amended General Order 22129 brings the rule in line with a First Amend-
ment right of access, it fails to meet each of the five objectives enumerated
above.
First, Amended General Order 22 adequately addresses the public no-
tice issue by providing for open docketing of search warrant materials in
generic terms (objective 2). Second, the order provides a mechanism to
challenge access and the closure of proceedings and documents that occur
during the decision making process (objective 3). Third, under the First
Amendment right to access, Amended General Order 22 properly sets forth
the burden of proof and the applicable test (objective 4).
In other aspects Amended General Order 22 is lacking. The rule is in-
adequate because its application of the First Amendment test fails to con-
sider the true objectives of access to search warrant documents at various
stages in the justice process. Specifically, the rule rejects the automatic seal-
ing of search warrant documents at the time of their issuance, provides arti-
ficial requirements and time frames for filing a motion to seal or opposing a
motion to unseal pre-indictment, and fails to provide a mechanism for con-
127. In re Four Search Warrants, 945 F. Supp. at 1569-70 (permitting identification
information as to third parties, information about government investigative methods, and
details of bomb device to be redacted).
128. See Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1989).
129. General Order 22 was initially amended on July 31, 2001. Following comments
from the government and members of the public, the order was modified on September 20,




tinued sealing following the filing of formal charges. In short the rule fails
to consider the legal and factual reality surrounding the issuance of a search
warrant, fails to consider adequately all the relevant interests at stake pre-
indictment, and sets forth a decision-making framework that creates more
problems than it solves.
1. The Lack ofAutomatic Sealing
The rule rejects automatic sealing of search warrant documents in fa-
vor of a requirement that the government file a motion for closure either at
the time the warrant is requested or within five working days after its execu-
tion. 130 This requirement ignores the practical and legal parameters of
search warrants. For example, when the government requests a search war-
rant, it has an ongoing investigation; otherwise the government would have
neither a basis for seeking a warrant nor any means by which to establish
probable cause.' 31 Because preserving the integrity of an ongoing investiga-
tion is one of the governmental interests that justifies continued sealing of
search warrant materials, even under a First Amendment analysis 132 auto-
matic sealing of search warrant documents at the inception simply reflects
factual and legal reality.
Second, irrespective of preserving the integrity of an ongoing investi-
gation, the privacy interests of subjects of the investigation are paramount at
this juncture in the judicial process. These individual privacy interests alone
justify the complete sealing of the warrant material pre-indictment. 
33
Again, automatic sealing of search warrant documents at the inception
would merely reflect this factual and legal reality.
Third, Amended General Order 22 does not adequately protect against
disclosure by the government. While the government normally has an inter-
est in sealing search warrant documents, there may be circumstances in
which the government perceives its interest is not to seal the material.
134
Absent an automatic sealing, there is no legal restriction on the govern-
ment's ability to disclose whatever aspects of the search and seizure it
130. The rule provides for limited automatic sealing in order to implement the procedural
aspects of the rule. In particular Amended General Order 22 provides that the warrant papers
will be sealed for five days following execution of the warrant and filing of the inventory
return.
131. The fact that the judiciary must find probable cause to authorize a warrant is a check
on the executive branch of government. It is part of the checks and balances built into our
governmental system by the Constitution of the United States. See supra note 16 and accom-
panying text.
132. See Gunn 1, 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 1988).
133. See Gunn AL 895 F.2d 460, 465 (8th Cir. 1990).
134. See supra note 30.
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wishes, which may run afoul of the public and individual interests in non-
disclosure. 135
2. Requirements for Motions To Seal and Responses to Motions To
Unseal
Amended General Order 22 requires that the motion to seal filed by the
government at the time it requests a warrant set forth that "(a) the govern-
ment has a compelling interest in ... [closure]; and (b) no less restrictive
alternative to sealing is appropriate or practical.' 36 If the government seeks
to seal the warrant after its issuance, it has five days from the date of execu-
tion to do so. In this latter circumstance, the motion must also establish that
the "basis for sealing was not known at the time of the warrant application,
despite due diligence.'
'1 37
These requirements and restrictions raise serious issues for a meaning-
ful balance of the interests at stake. First, requiring the government to state
specifically its "compelling interest" at the time its seeks a warrant ignores
the importance of the inherent investigative status of the case pre-
indictment. Essentially, this requirement is an outgrowth of the rule's inat-
tention to the reality discussed above. Moreover, the requirement that the
government justify why a later motion to seal was not filed at the time of the
warrant application injects a standard into the balancing equation that has no
basis in the First Amendment test and no proper role.
The second serious concern is that the rule appears to restrict the gov-
ernment's basis for seeking closure to a compelling governmental interest.
This leaves no room for the government to assert the privacy interests of
affected persons, such as targets, their families or associates, and wit-
nesses.1 38 Legally, the government may assert those interests as grounds for
closure. 39 Certainly, an argument can be made that the government has a
duty to assert those interests. After all, the government is charged with the
responsibility of respecting and preserving the rights of its citizens, includ-
ing the individual's privacy interest in non-disclosure of search warrant
material. 
40
135. See chart supra Part IV.B.
136. See Amended General Order 22, infra Appendix B.
137. Id.
138. While the privacy interests of government informants, and even perhaps third par-
ties who provide information to the government, may be expressed in terms of a "govern-
mental interest" as opposed to an individual privacy interest, the interests of investigative
subjects or associates that are mentioned in the application may be excluded under this rule.
139. United States v. Sealed Search Warrants, Nos. 99-1096, 99-1097, 99-1098, 1999
WL 1455215, at *8 (D. N.J. Sept. 2, 1999).
140. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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Third, Amended General Order 22 provides that affected persons who
have an assertable privacy interest may file a motion to seal within the five-
day automatic sealing time frame. The rule, however, neither defines "af-
fected persons" nor provides a means of notifying them that they may have
a privacy interest in the search warrant materials that they may want to pro-
tect. In essence the rule presumes that an affected person is the one whose
property is searched. This is obviously an erroneous assumption, because
there may be others affected as well. There is both a property interest and an
information privacy interest at stake, yet the rule's notice presumption is
only valid as to the property interest. In Gunn I it was MDC's property that
was searched.1 41 Moreover, the litigation focused on a search warrant for an
area not directly under Gunn's control-it was the search of the secretarial
area outside the office of Thomas Gunn.142 Obviously Gunn became aware
of the search warrant and intervened to assert his own privacy interests, as
did four other unidentified persons.
1 43
Suppose for example that the place to be searched is a house belonging
to A where drugs have been stored by and for B. Execution of the search
warrant requires that a copy of the warrant and the inventory return be left
with A or at the premises. 44 Thus, absent the institution of a notice re-
quirement not contemplated by nor provided for by the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, B would only know of the warrant if A tells him.
1 45
Finally, the order appropriately provides that a person or entity want-
ing to challenge the sealing of warrant papers must submit a motion stating
the specific grounds for access. The order also appropriately provides that
the burden is on the party seeking continued closure. 146 The order appears to
restrict opposition to the motion, however, to the party that obtained the
original order to seal. 147 Again, using Gunn I as an example, the government
obtained the original order to seal and successfully defended against a me-
dia request for access. Subsequently, the government notified the district
court that it no longer had a reason to continue closure, and the media re-
newed its request. MDC, Gunn, and four other persons successfully opposed
141. See Gunn I, 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 1988).
142. Id.
143. See Gunn 11, 895 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir. 1990).
144. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(3).
145. Presumably the individual seeking closure of warrant material would have access to
the search material, including the affidavit, since this scenario would only be meaningful if
the government had chosen not to seek closure of the warrant material.
146. The burden on the party seeking continued closure is appropriate because of the
First Amendment application.
147. In pertinent part, Amended General Order 22 reads: "In opposing . . . a motion
(seeking to challenge the sealing of warrant documents], the party who obtained the order to
seal has the burden of establishing that a compelling interest justifies a restriction .... See
infra Appendix B (emphasis added).
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disclosure in Gunn II. Under Amended General Order 22, once the govern-
ment withdraws its request to continue closure, no other party can move for
continued sealing, and the warrant material becomes public.
3. Post-Charge Process
The final limitation of Amended General Order 22 concerns the proc-
ess once charges are filed. Like General Order 22, the Amended Order pro-
vides that the sealed material is to be opened after a related indictment or
information is filed. Also similar to General Order 22, the Amended Order
provides no further process and contemplates no situation in which contin-
ued closure might be warranted either to protect a governmental interest or
an individual privacy interest.
148
IX. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The most important aspects of determining pre-indictment access to
search warrant materials are the balancing of identified interests and consid-
eration of the importance of the interests given the status of the case in the
justice process. These premises can be embodied in an access rule or proce-
dure that places discretion with the court to balance the interests at hand
according to the posture of the case and the phase of the proceedings.
Such a procedure would be similar to the common law access refer-
enced in Times Mirror149 and more correctly applied, analytically, in In re
Macon Telegraph Co. 150 The common law access test does not place a right
of access with the public or the individual, but rather requires the party
seeking access to show that "disclosure would serve the ends of justice."
' 151
Where circuit courts have applied the common law access test in the pre-
indictment, investigative stage, the government's interest in investigation
always seems to override a "need to know."
'1 52
Current law in the Eighth Circuit poses additional challenges to draft-
ing a pre-indictment access procedure. Under the First Amendment test in
Gunn 1, a constitutional right of access is paramount, with the burden to
show continued closure resting upon the government or affected party.'53 It
is worth noting that the Eighth Circuit takes great pains to draw the First
Amendment test from post-indictment cases, and gives virtually no consid-
148. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
149. See Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 1989).
150. 900 F. Supp. 489,491 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
151. Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219 (holding that, "[u]nder this important public need or
'ends of justice' standard, appellants' claim [for access] must be rejected").
152. See id.; Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 F.2d 60, 66 (4th Cir. 1989).
153. Gunn , 855 F.2d 569, 574 (8th Cir. 1988).
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eration to the nature of the interests at stake pre-indictment. Even after a
thorough analysis of the constitutional right, however, the court found in
favor of non-disclosure pre-indictment. This was true whether the govern-
ment or an affected party sought continued closure.' 54 Given the Eighth
Circuit's conclusions in Gunn I and Gunn II, it is hard to imagine a circum-
stance where a First Amendment right of access would ever prevail over the
need for non-disclosure pre-indictment.
In addition the rule recognizes the presumption of non-disclosure from
the time the warrant is issued through the time official charges are filed.
This presumption can be implemented through automatic sealing of the
search warrant documents pre-indictment. Without automatic sealing, filing
a motion to seal is left to the discretion of the government. Although the
government usually moves to seal such material, it is not required to do so,
and, in some cases, has not. This leaves affected individuals without the
protection of non-disclosure from the beginning and essentially no remedy
once information is released publicly. ' 55
Whether applying the Eighth Circuit First Amendment test or another
circuit's common law access test, an access procedure can be drafted to
embody the five objectives of a good access rule. The primary differences in
the First Amendment rule and the common law access rule are the party
who bears the burden of proof and the standard of proof required. Under the
First Amendment, the party seeking closure bears the burden of showing a
'compelling interest for sealing,' and why 'no less restrictive means are
available. ' 56 Under the common law, the party seeking access bears the
burden of showing a need for access that meets the ends of justice.'57 If
these burdens and standards of proof are considered by the court along with
(1) an acknowledgment of the interests; (2) public notice that the documents
exist; (3) a mechanism for requesting access (or continued sealing); and (4)
recognition of the interests in the context of the stage of the justice process,
the rule will adequately address access to search warrant materials. An ex-
ample of a rule drafted for a First Amendment jurisdiction and a common
law jurisdiction are attached in Appendices CI and C2, respectively. It is
probable that in the majority of pre-indictment cases, the need for continued
sealing will prevail under either access test.
154. See generally discussion of Gunn I and H, supra Parts IV.A-B.
155. See supra note 30.
156. See Gunn I, 855 F.2d at 574 (quoting In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 115 (2d
Cir. 1987)) (adopting the burden of proof in Press-Enterprise II, which requires the party to
show that "closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to that inter-
est," and adopting the standard in Press-Enterprise I, noting that the court must "explain why
closure or sealing was necessary and why less restrictive alternatives were not appropriate").
157. See Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1219.
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X. CONCLUSION
One foundation of democracy is an open society, and the concept of an
open society necessarily means public access to governmental functions.
Societal interests are not promoted at every instance, however, by immedi-
ate public access. For example, the investigation and prosecution of crimi-
nal conduct is to the benefit of society, not to its detriment. In determining
the extent and scope of access to search warrant documents, it is essential to
consider the interests at stake, namely those of the government, the affected
individual, and the public. It is also essential to recognize that these interests
vary at different stages in the justice process and may result in different
access outcomes. Insofar as courts have dealt with the conflicting interests
in addressing access to search warrant materials, they have failed to differ-
entiate the process from the result and have failed to articulate a meaningful
standard by which other courts may be guided.
In the final analysis, it is clear that courts heavily support closure of
search warrant materials prior to the initiation of charges but favor access
following the filing of charges, save redaction to protect the informational
privacy interests of uncharged persons. The proposed decisional framework
set forth in the appendix reflects this legal reality.
APPENDIX A
GENERAL ORDER 22 (AS ADOPTED ON JUNE 14,1982)
Upon the return of an executed search warrant issued by a magistrate
or judge of this Court, all papers in connection therewith shall be filed by
the magistrate with the Clerk of the Court. The Clerk shall maintain a mis-
cellaneous confidential file containing the warrant and all other papers until
an indictment or information is filed. Thereafter,., the Clerk shall transfer the
warrant and other papers to the case file.
Any person desiring a copy of the papers maintained in the confiden-
tial files must file a motion, directed to the magistrate or judge, requesting
release of the material. The motion must demonstrate good cause for said
request. Good cause is presumed when the request is made by persons di-




AMENDED GENERAL ORDER 22
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WARRANTS
Because there is a compelling interest in protecting from public disclo-
sure all search or seizure warrant-related documents until the warrant is
executed or becomes unexecutable and because no less restrictive alterna-
tive is practical to protect that interest, the issuing District or Magistrate
Judge must maintain the confidentiality of all warrant-related documents
until they are delivered to the Clerk for filing. Upon receipt of the return
inventory on an executed warrant, or upon expiration the time specified in
the warrant for its execution, the Judge must deliver all warrant-related pa-
pers to the Clerk of Court for filing in a miscellaneous warrant file.
In order to request that the Judge seal some or all of the documents in
any miscellaneous warrant file, the United States Attorney must submit an
ex parte motion to seal, along with a proposed Order granting that motion.
This motion must state reasonably specific facts which establish that: (a) the
government has a compelling interest in sealing the documents in question
which outweighs the public's qualified first amendment right of access to
review those documents; and (b) no less restrictive alternative to sealing is
appropriate or practical. Ordinarily, such a motion must be filed at the
time of application for the warrant. If grounds to seal arise after the war-
rant has been issued, the United States may, within five working days after
the Clerk has filed the warrant papers, submit an exparte motion to seal and
a proposed order. The motion must establish, in addition to the above
grounds, that the basis for sealing was not known at the time of the warrant
application, despite due diligence.
Because there may be cases in which a person's or other entity's pri-
vacy interests rise to the level of a compelling interest sufficient to justify
sealing documents in a warrant file, such persons or entities may file a mo-
tion to seal, ex parte, within five working days after the Clerk has filed the
warrant papers.
If no motion to seal has been filed within five working days after the
Clerk has filed the warrant papers, the Clerk must open the file to the public
for inspection and copying. If a motion to seal is filed, the miscellaneous
warrant file must remain sealed until the Judge has ruled on the motion. The
Judge must rule on any motion to seal within five working days after the
motion is filed. If a motion to seal is denied, the miscellaneous warrant file
must remain sealed during the period in which an appeal may be filed.
When the Judge delivers the warrant papers to the Clerk for filing, the
Clerk must create and maintain a separate miscellaneous file which must
contain the application for the warrant, all supporting affidavits and any
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return inventory, related motions or orders. The Clerk must also create and
maintain a docket sheet, open to the public for inspection and copying, for
every miscellaneous warrant file, including files in which an order to seal
has been entered. The docket sheet must contain docket entries that describe
generally each document in the file and reflect the number of pages of each
such document. If the Judge enters an order granting a motion to seal, the
Clerk must maintain all documents within the scope of the order to seal in a
sealed miscellaneous file.
Any person or other entity seeking to challenge the grounds supporting
an order to seal documents contained in a miscellaneous warrant file must
submit a motion, directed to the Magistrate Judge or District Judge who
signed the warrant, stating specific grounds supporting the release of the
sealed documents. In opposing such a motion, the party who obtained the
order to seal has the burden of establishing that compelling interest justifies
a restriction of the public's qualified first amendment right of access to the
documents in question and that no less restrictive alternative to sealing is
appropriate or practical. In appropriate case, the Judge may conduct an in
camera hearing to develop the facts necessary to determine whether a com-
pelling interest justifies sealing the documents in question. If the Judge con-
cludes that the documents should remain under seal, the Judge will enter an
order under seal containing specific findings that explain why sealing is
necessary and why no less restrictive alternatives are practical or appropri-
ate. The Clerk must open any sealed miscellaneous warrant file after a re-
lated indictment or information is filed. (Emphasis in original.)
APPENDIX C-1
EXAMPLE ACCESS RULE-COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS
JURISDICTION
A. Issuance of a Warrant; Warrant-Related Material Prior to the Execu-
tion and Return of Inventory
Because there exist governmental and personal privacy interests that
outweigh the public's qualified common law right of access to unexecuted
search or seizure warrant-related documents, upon issuance of a search or
seizure warrant, the issuing District Judge or Magistrate Judge must main-
tain the confidentiality of all warrant-related documents.
B. Return of Inventory or Unexecuted Warrants
Upon receipt of the return inventory on an executed warrant, or upon
expiration of the time specified in the warrant for its execution, the Judge
must deliver all warrant-related papers to the Clerk of Court for filing in a
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confidential miscellaneous warrant file. The Clerk must create and maintain
a docket sheet, open to the public for inspection and copying, for every mis-
cellaneous warrant file. The docket sheet must contain docket entries that
describe generally each document in the file and reflect the number of pages
of each such document.
C. Sealing of Warrants and Warrant-Related Documents; Release to
Defendant or Counsel for Defendant
Because there are ongoing governmental and personal privacy interests
in the contents of the executed search warrant-related documents prior to the
institution of charges against an individual or entity, the Clerk of Court shall
maintain these documents under seal. Once charges have been filed against
an individual or entity affected by the search warrant, and the individual or
entity has made an initial appearance or appeared for an arraignment before
a Magistrate Judge or District Judge, whichever occurs first, the defendant
and/or counsel for the defendant is entitled to a copy of the warrant, return
of inventory, application for the warrant, and any attachments thereto. After
the passage of five working days from the initial appearance or arraignment,
the Clerk must open the file to the public for inspection and copying, unless
an affected party or the United States files a motion seeking continued clo-
sure of the warrant.
D. Request for Access
At any time before warrant-related material becomes open for public
inspection and copying by application of Paragraph C of this Rule, any per-
son may request unsealing of the warrant-related materiall The request for
unsealing shall be done by written motion directed to the Magistrate Judge
or District Judge who signed the warrant and shall state specific grounds
supporting the release of the sealed documents.
E. Burden of Proof and Procedure
A party filing a motion for continued closure of warrant-related mate-
rial pursuant to Paragraph C of this Rule, or a party filing a motion for ac-
cess to warrant-related documents pursuant to Paragraph D of this rule, has
the burden of establishing that the requested action meets the ends of jus-
tice, and that their interest outweighs any competing government, individual
or public interest. In appropriate cases, the Judge may receive pleadings
and/or material in camera and may conduct an in camera hearing to develop
the facts necessary to determine whether a compelling interest justifies the
continued sealing of the documents in question. If the Judge concludes that
the documents should remain under seal, the Judge will enter an order under
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seal containing specific findings that explain why sealing is necessary and
why no less restrictive alternatives are practical or appropriate. During the
pendency of any such motion or opposition to such motion, the file shall
remain sealed unless directed otherwise by the Magistrate Judge or District
Judge before whom the motion is pending.
F. Stay During Appeal
If the District Judge or Magistrate Judge determines that all or part of
warrant-related materials should be unsealed, the Judge's order and all other
warrant-related material shall remain sealed until the time to file notice of
appeal has expired, or during the pendency of any appeal so filed.
APPENDIX C-2
EXAMPLE ACCESS RULE-FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
ACCESS JURISDICTION
A. Issuance of a Warrant; Warrant-Related Material Prior to the Execution
and Return of Inventory
Because there exist compelling governmental and personal privacy in-
terests that outweigh the public's qualified First Amendment right of access
and qualified common law right of access to unexecuted search or seizure
warrant-related documents, and because no less restrictive alternative is
practical to protecting these interests, upon issuance of a search or seizure
warrant the issuing District Judge or Magistrate Judge must maintain the
confidentiality of all warrant-related documents.
B. Return of Inventory or Unexecuted Warrants
Upon receipt of the return inventory on an executed warrant, or upon
expiration of the time specified in the warrant for its execution, the Judge
must deliver all warrant-related papers to the Clerk of Court for filing in a
confidential miscellaneous warrant file. The Clerk must create and maintain
a docket sheet, open to the public for inspection and copying, for every mis-
cellaneous warrant file. The docket sheet must contain docket entries that
describe generally each document in the file and reflect the number of pages
of each such document.
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C. Sealing of Warrants and Warrant-Related Documents; Release to
Defendant or Counsel for Defendant
Because there are compelling ongoing governmental and personal pri-
vacy interests in the contents of the executed search warrant-related docu-
ments prior to the institution of charges against an individual or entity, the
Clerk of Court shall maintain these documents under seal. Once charges
have been filed against an individual or entity affected by the search war-
rant, and the individual or entity has made an initial appearance or appeared
for an arraignment before a Magistrate Judge or District Judge, whichever
occurs first, the defendant and/or counsel for the defendant is entitled to a
copy of the warrant, return of inventory, application for the warrant, and any
attachments thereto. After the passage of five working days from the initial
appearance or arraignment, the Clerk must open the file to the public for
inspection and copying, unless an affected party or the United States files a
motion seeking continued closure of the warrant.
D. Request for Access
At any time before warrant-related material becomes open for public
inspection and copying by application of Paragraph C of this Rule, any per-
son may request unsealing of the warrant-related material. The request for
unsealing shall be done by written motion directed to the Magistrate Judge
or District Judge who signed the warrant and shall state specific grounds
supporting the release of the sealed documents.
E. Burden of Proof and Procedure
A party filing a motion for continued closure of warrant-related mate-
rial pursuant to Paragraph C of this Rule, or a party opposing a motion
which has been filed seeking to unseal warrant-related documents pursuant
to Paragraph D of this rule, has the burden of establishing that a compelling
interest justifies a restriction of the public's qualified First Amendment right
of access to the documents in question articulated by the Eighth Circuit in In
re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Thomas Gunn
(Gunn J),158 and that no less restrictive alternative to continued sealing is
appropriate or practical. In appropriate cases, the Judge may receive plead-
ings and/or material in camera and may conduct an in camera hearing to
develop the facts necessary to determine whether a compelling interest justi-
fies the continued sealing of the documents in question. If the Judge con-
cludes that the documents should remain under seal, the Judge will enter an
158. 855 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1988).
[Vol. 25
2003] ACCESS TO SEARCH WARRANT MATERIALS 817
order under seal containing specific findings that explain why sealing is
necessary and why no less restrictive alternatives are practical or appropri-
ate. During the pendency of any such motion or opposition to such motion,
the file shall remain sealed unless directed otherwise by the Magistrate
Judge or District Judge before whom the motion is pending.
F. Stay During Appeal
If the District Judge or Magistrate Judge determines that all or part of
warrant-related materials should be unsealed, the Judge's order and all other
warrant-related material shall remain sealed until the time to file notice of
appeal has expired, or during the pendency of any appeal so filed.

